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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis was written to promote awareness of wireless network security to the ICT industry 
and the general public. It gives an overview of the current security state in Oslo, Bergen, 
Kristiansand, Tromsø and Flekkefjord. The data was gathered through war-walking and war-
driving in the mentioned cities, and the results were deduced from an analysis of 35 194 
wireless networks. The findings showed that 36 % was either unencrypted or encrypted with 
the deprecated WEP protocol. Through the analysis of these and other findings, this thesis 
discusses the role of parties influencing wireless network security. It also provides a 
description of potential consequences, followed by counter-measures and recommendations. 
The magnitude of insecure wireless networks is a major risk to Norwegian citizens and to the 
society itself. 
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GLOSSARY 
  
Brute force   Trying every possible combination of characters (e.g. aaa, aab, aac). 
 
Counter Mode with 
Cipher Block 
Chaining Message 
Authentication Code 
Protocol (CCMP) 
 
Encryption protocol that uses the AES encryption standard. It was 
created to address the vulnerabilities presented by TKIP.  
Cloud-based   Computational resources available from internet on demand. 
 
CPU cluster Linked computers that are able to work together on the same task. 
 
Denial of Service An attempt to make network resources unavailable to its intended 
users. 
 
Dictionary attack Trying values from a pre-arranged list as passphrases. 
 
Extensible 
Authentication 
Protocol (EAP) 
   
An authentication framework that provides an infrastructure for 
network access clients and authentication servers. 
 
Internet Protocol (IP) 
address 
 
A numeric label assigned to devices participating in a network such 
as a local area network or the Internet. 
 
Internet Relay Chat 
(IRC) 
 
A protocol for real-time Internet text messaging.  
 
Internet service 
provider (ISP) 
 
An organization that provides Internet access to its customers. 
MAC address 
 
A unique identifier for every network interface controller (network 
card or other network devices). 
 
Monitor mode Allows for packets to be captured without having to associate with 
the access point. 
 
Packet analyser 
 
A computer program that can intercept and analyse packets being 
transferred over the network. 
 
Pairwise Master Key 
(PMK) 
 
Hash of the network SSID and passphrase.   
PHP 
 
Service-side scripting language that produces dynamic web pages. 
Pre-shared key (PSK) A key shared between parties before it is being used. 
 
 
viii 
 
Quality of Service 
(QoS) 
 
Mechanisms for controlling traffic resources on a network.  
Remote 
Authentication Dial In 
User Service 
(RADIUS) 
 
A protocol for authentication, authorization and accounting 
management in networking. 
 
Radio frequency (RF) 
signals 
 
Radio waves that have been modulated to contain information. 
 
Service set identifier 
(SSID) 
 
The public name of a wireless network. 
Temporal Key 
Integrity Protocol 
(TKIP) 
 
A security protocol developed to replace the deprecated WEP 
protocol.  
Urban canyon effect 
 
Tall buildings blocking radio reception such as GPS signals. 
War-walking / war-
driving 
 
The act of walking or driving with a portable computer in search of 
multiple wireless networks. 
Wired Equivalent 
Privacy (WEP ) 
 
A deprecated encryption protocol for wireless networks. 
Wi-Fi Protected 
Access (WPA) 
 
An encryption protocol for wireless networks based on TKIP or 
CCMP. 
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1   INTRODUCTION 
Norway is a modern nation with a population of 5 million citizens. It has a high standard of 
living and according to Statistic Norway
1
, 93 % of the Norwegian population uses the Internet 
(SSB 2011b). Many are aware of the Internet network’s dangers of malware, phishing 
attempts and e-mail scams, but not so many are aware of the dangers within their own local 
area network. As wireless network propagation is increasing together with the necessity of 
easy Internet access, the risk of attacks on local area networks must be taken seriously. 
Furthermore, the increasing information traffic over Internet, both in the private and public 
sector, makes the question of security and privacy highly pertinent. Additionally, the current 
development rate of electronic equipment requires a corresponding development of security 
measures. My understanding is that the customers’ demand of a quick and easy gateway to 
Internet may lead manufactures and developers into giving security aspects a lesser priority. 
This master’s thesis aims to provide information about the current state of the security usage 
on wireless local area networks (WLANs
2
) in Oslo, Bergen, Kristiansand, Tromsø and 
Flekkefjord. The data that will be presented has been gathered by using wireless equipment to 
retrieve information from wireless access points
3
 and routers. My intention is not only to find 
unencrypted and open networks, but also to look for networks with deprecated or insufficient 
encryption. By comparing my findings with older research I expect to see a large increase in 
the total number of wireless networks and also some improvement in terms of encryption 
usage. In accordance to this assumed development, I also find it interesting to investigate the 
role manufacturers, Internet service providers (ISPs) and other parties have in affecting 
encryption usage on wireless networks.  
To investigate the mentioned concerns I have defined the following research questions: 
 
 
                                                 
1
 Statistisk sentralbyrå. 
2
 The term WLAN will be used for any single access point or router found, even though some of them could be 
linked together and combined is creating a single WLAN. 
3
 I will use the term access point when it is uncertain whether the device in question is an access point or a 
wireless router. 
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RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
1. What is the current state of WLAN encryption in Norway? 
a. How secure are the wireless networks? 
b. Does city population or location affect encryption usage?  
2. How are Internet service providers affecting the situation? 
3. What consequences can poor WLAN encryption have for our society? 
a. Have encryption practices changed over the last few years? 
b. What can be done to improve today’s situation? 
 
Before I started my research, I had the understanding that a high number of WLANs were 
unencrypted or had encryption that could be easily broken. This assumption was based on 
various minor studies I had done in the past, as well as articles about encryption usage 
patterns in the 802.11 standards. The first research question in this master’s thesis is based 
on that assumption, and I will try to answer it by looking at the magnitude of the various 
security protocols. 
My second research question is based on increased media coverage of vulnerabilities in 
access points caused by the manufacturer or Internet service providers. It is common for many 
Internet users to have routers with encryption preconfigured by their ISP. If vulnerabilities in 
these router types are found, the large amount of exposed WLANs is problematic. This 
motivated me to investigate whether or not the Internet providers are actively trying to 
improve security in wireless networks. 
In my third research question I will try to give an overview of the risks we face by not 
securing our WLANs properly. I also look for tendencies of improvement and suggest several 
methods of countermeasure. 
In the following second chapter I will present background information beneficial to 
comprehend the results of my study. The chapter will explain basic vulnerabilities in 802.11 
encryption methods, risks of wireless networking and present similar studies. In the third 
chapter I present my method of research from a theoretical and practical aspect as well as 
discussing reliability and validity. I then present my research results in the fourth chapter, 
followed by a discussion in chapter five. Finally, I summarize my thesis in chapter six and 
give suggestions for future research. 
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2   BACKGROUND 
At the end of 2002 there were 224 000 active broadband subscriptions in Norway (SSB 
2011d). Now there are more than 1 730 000 and 73 % of all households have broadband 
access (SSB 2011c). This is consistent with Internet usage prevalence of 35 % in 2002 rising 
to 77 % in 2010 (SSB 2011a). The increasing Internet dependence has led to increased 
broadband coverage and vice versa. Furthermore, introduction of handheld devices such as 
notebooks, smartphones and tablets has strengthened this dependence and many users now 
require wireless access to the Internet. 
In this chapter I will introduce wireless networks and its history, followed by security flaws 
and methods to exploit them. I will then briefly introduce Internet service providers before I 
show examples of risks associated with wireless networking. Finally, I will present similar 
studies by other researchers.  
2.1  Wireless Local Area Networks 
In this thesis, WLAN refers to wireless networks under the IEEE 802.1 set of standards. IEEE 
stands for Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers and is the world’s largest 
professional association dedicated to advancing technological innovation and excellence. 
While wireless is a superset of the Wi-Fi certification by the Wi-Fi Alliance, not every 
802.11-compliant device is Wi-Fi certified.  
In 802.11 Wireless Networks: The Definitive Guide, Matthew Gast (2005) points out that 
wireless networks offer great advantages over wired networks in aspects such as mobility and 
flexibility. Users are no longer limited to a fixed position and “no cables means no recabling” 
(Gast 2005, XII). Before 1997, users who wanted to set up wireless networks were forced to 
“adopt single-vendor solutions with all of the risk that entailed” (Gast 2005, XIII). With the 
completion of the IEEE 802.11 standard that year, the ball had started rolling and everything 
became easier. Naturally, without wires it also became easier for intruders to eavesdrop on the 
data packets being sent over the network. To deal with this problem IEEE implemented a 
security protocol into the 802.11 ratification called Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP). Despite 
the confident name, WEP was declared deprecated by IEEE in 2004 due to serious flaws in its 
algorithm (IEEE 2004). Nevertheless, WEP is still quite commonly used on wireless 
networks. To replace this faulty encryption, Wi-Fi Alliance created Wi-Fi Protected Access 
(WPA) that became ratified in 2004 (IEEE). WPA basically has two modes. The simpler one 
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called WPA-PSK or WPA Personal uses an 8 to 64 character long passphrase (63 ASCII or 64 
hexadecimals) shared between the wireless clients on the network (Gast 2005). The other 
mode, WPA-802.1X or WPA Enterprise, is more difficult to configure as it relies on RADIUS 
servers and EAP for authentication (Gast 2005). 
2.1.1  Breaking WLAN Encryption 
There are several attacks on wireless networks that can damage the network itself or its users. 
For this thesis I will focus on attacks conducted to break into networks, rather than attacks to 
sabotage or deny accessibility. The process of cracking passwords for wireless networks 
depends on the encryption and authentication being used on the access point. WEP, WPA-
PSK and WPA2-PSK are all possible to crack if given enough time. While there are attacks 
on the more secure authentication mechanism 802.1X, I have decided to focus on pre-shared 
keys (PSK) which is designed for home and small offices and where attacks are simpler to 
perform. I also expected the use of PSK to be far more common than 802.1X.  
2.1.1.1 Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) 
In 2001, Fluhrer, Mantin and Shamir (2001) presented weaknesses in the RC4 algorithm used 
in the WEP protocol. The same year their work led to the free tools AirSnort and WEPCrack 
being created, which allowed anyone to crack WEP keys on cheap hardware (AirSnort 2011; 
Rager 2011). Because AirSnort required 5 to 10 million encrypted data packets to be 
gathered, the process could take days on networks with little traffic. The cracking of the WEP 
password itself took less than a second (AirSnort 2011). A popular tool suite for cracking 
WLAN passwords today is called Aircrack-ng. This suite has the old Fluhrer, Mantin, Shamir 
(FMS) attack implemented but also takes advantage of more recent attacks such as the KoreK 
chopchop from 2004 that reduced the number of required packets to 300 000 – 1 000 000 
depending on whether it was 64 or 128 bit encryption (Devine 2011). The most commonly 
used attack in Aircrack-ng however is the PTW attack which Tews, Weinmann and Pyshkin 
(2007) demonstrated could crack a 128 bit WEP key with a success probability of 50 % with 
less than 40 000 packets. For 95 % success probability they claimed only 85 000 packets was 
needed. Erik Tews, together with Martin Beck, later improved this attack to only need 24 200 
packets for a 50 % success rate (Tews and Beck 2009). Nevertheless, as patiently waiting for 
packets still takes time on less trafficked networks, active attacks drastically reduce the time 
required to crack a WEP key. A popular active attack is called ARP request replay (Devine 
2011). This attack listens for a packet that contains data needed to crack the key, and then 
retransmits it back to the access point (Carpenter and Barrett 2008). The access point will then 
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repeat the packet but with new data needed for the WEP cracking. By doing this over and 
over it is possible to generate almost 1 000 packets per second (Tews, Weinmann, and 
Pyshkin 2007). By using their PTW attack and replaying packets to the access point, Tews, 
Weinmann and Pyshkin (2007) showed that WEP could be cracked in less than 60 seconds. 
2.1.1.2 Wi-Fi Protected Access PSK and Wi-Fi Protected Access II PSK 
Cracking WPA-PSK and WPA2-PSK is normally not as easy as cracking WEP. The two 
encryption protocols used in WPA and WPA2 are called TKIP (Temporary Key Integrity 
Protocol) and CCMP (Counter Mode with Cipher Block Chaining Message Authentication 
Code Protocol). Even though Tews and Beck (2009) and others have presented functional 
attacks on TKIP, the encryption has not been cracked in the same way as WEP. CCMP is on 
the other hand far more secure. 
WPA-PSK and WPA2-PSK encryption relies on a pairwise master key (PMK) which is 
computed from the network name (SSID
4
) and the PSK (the passphrase) (Cache, Wright, and 
Liu 2010). To crack this PMK and end up with the PSK, the current method is a dictionary 
attack that matches words to the passphrase, or brute-forcing by trying every possible 
combination of characters, e.g. aaa, aab, aac... (Gast 2005). To be able to do this, it is 
necessary to monitor the network to capture the handshake that occurs when a user connects 
or reconnects (Gast 2005). Instead of waiting for this to happen it is possible to use an attack 
that disconnects a chosen user from the network, forcing him to reconnect (Devine 2011). 
When the handshake from this authentication has been gathered, there is no longer a need to 
monitor the network. The brute-force or dictionary attack can then be executed on a remote 
system where the cracking speed depends on the hardware of this system. A security 
researcher from Elcomsoft Co. Ltd. informed
5
 me that their Windows software Elcomsoft 
Wireless Network Security (EWSA) is able to try 115 000 WPA passphrases per second by 
utilizing the new AMD Radeon HD 6990 graphics card (~5 000 NOK
6
). When considering 
that a standard
7
 CPU (central processing unit) today is able to do only 4 000 passphrases per 
second, the contrast of using GPU (graphical processing unit) is vast. For UNIX-based 
operating systems there is an open source software called Pyrit that is also able to crack PSK 
using GPU. Online reports suggest that the combination of Pyrit and the HD 6990 graphics 
                                                 
4
 Service set identifier. Broadcasted network names for access points are sometimes called ESSID, but in this 
thesis I will use SSID. 
5
 E-mail correspondence, 01.04.2011. 
6
 09.05.2011. Retail price in the United States: 699 USD. 
7
 Intel Core i7 920 2.66 GHz. 
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card is able to process 170 000 passphrases per second. These rates lead to the following time 
periods of cracking PSK by brute-force: 
Passphrase length and type of characters EWSA Pyrit 
8 characters, only digits 15 minutes 10 minutes 
8 characters, lower case alphabetic 22 days 14 days 
8 characters, lower case alphabetic and digits 10 months 6 months 
10 characters, only digits 25 hours 16 hours 
10 characters, hexadecimals 110 days 75 days 
10 characters, lower case alphabetic 40 years 26 years 
10 characters, lower case alphabetic and digits 1 023 years 675 years 
Table 2.1 – PSK cracking rate with HD 6990 in EWSA and Pyrit 
 
This means that while a given passphrase “84150723” takes up to 15 minutes to crack, adding 
the letters “xy” to it increases the cracking period to 29 years.  
There are also alternatives to running the cracking process on your own system, where you 
upload a file containing the handshake between client and access point to an online cracker. 
For instance, the web page of WPA cracker
8
 offers a cracking service on a 400 CPU cluster 
that tries 286 million words in 55 minutes for 40 USD. This rate of password cracking equals 
87 000 words per second. Another similar service is the WPA Password Cracker
9
 by Question 
Defense that charges 10 USD to work through a password list of 982 million words in 3 
hours. A third alternative is Recover WPA
10
 which uses a dictionary of 700 million words and 
lets you check the encryption strength of a network for free. If the passphrase is found, they 
charge 15 GBP to reveal it.  
An alternative that offers more customization was reported by Reuters in January 2011, where 
Thomas Roth, a computer security consultant, used 8 instances of Amazon’s cloud-based 
computers to perform a WPA-PSK attack at 400 000 keys per second (Finkle 2011). For this 
computational resource, Amazon charged 0.28 USD per minute and the attack lasted about 20 
minutes before Roth found the passphrase (Finkle 2011). According to Reuters, Roth has 
since then updated his software and believes he could hack the same network in just 6 minutes 
(Finkle 2011). Table 2.2 below shows time and cost of brute-forcing different strengths of 
passwords with Roth’s updated software (estimated to be 3 times as fast as previous version). 
Even though Amazon offers reserved instances based on a yearly fee and a lower cost per 
                                                 
8
 The web page for WPA cracker can be found at: http://www.wpacracker.com/   
9
 The web page for WPA Password Cracker can be found at: http://tools.question-defense.com/  
10
 The web page for Recover WPA can be found at: http://www.recoverwpa.com/  
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minute, I have used 0.28 USD per minute for the sake of comparison. Amazon now allows the 
use of 64 simultaneous instances, which in theory should make it possible to reach almost 10 
million passphrases per second, but subsequently to the cost of 2.24 USD per minute.  
I contacted Roth several times in order to hear the current state of his approach, but 
unfortunately he did not respond to my enquiries.  
Passphrase length and type of characters Time Cost 
8 characters, only digits 83 seconds 0.39 USD 
8 characters, lower case alphabetic 48 hours 806 USD 
8 characters, lower case alphabetic and digits 27 days 10 886 USD 
10 characters, only digits 2 hours 34 USD 
10 characters, hexadecimals 11 days 4 435 USD 
10 characters, lower case alphabetic 4 years 588 672 USD 
10 characters, lower case alphabetic and digits 97 years 14 275 296 USD 
Table 2.2 – PSK cracking cost with Amazon, 0.28 USD/minute and 1 200 000 PSK/second 
 
Brute-forcing WPA-PSK works by taking the passphrase attempt in plain text, encrypting it, 
and then comparing the result to the encrypted hash (Cache, Wright, and Liu 2010). Because 
the encrypting process is the most processor-intensive part, pre-computed hash tables can 
speed up the password cracking dramatically. But since the PMK is a hash of both SSID and 
passphrase, the pre-computed hash table needs to be specified to a single SSID to work. Such 
tables are for that reason only useful if generated for popular network names (Cache, Wright, 
and Liu 2010). For the 1 000 most common SSIDs, Church of Wifi
11
 has created 40 GB of 
hash tables from a list of 1 000 000 words. With the use of such tables it is possible to try 
millions of passphrases per second on a normal CPU. 
Prior to Tews and Beck’s TKIP attack in 2008, the only practical attack against TKIP was the 
previously mentioned PSK brute force attack which is also applicable to CCMP (Halvorsen et 
al. 2009). However, the TKIP attack by Beck and Tews, which was later improved by 
Halvorsen et al., is not a key recovery attack and should therefore not be compared to the 
FMS and PTW attacks. In practice, the TKIP attack makes it easy to perform Denial of 
Service (DoS) attacks on wireless networks, which prevents accessibility for the network’s 
intended users (Halvorsen et al. 2009). Though not yet implemented, Halvorsen et al. (2009) 
also describe a theoretical approach to spoofing the DNS (Domain Name System) server. 
Simply put, when a user types in a web page address, DNS spoofing makes it possible to 
                                                 
11
 The Church of Wifi web page can be found at: http://www.churchofwifi.org/  
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redirect the user onto a fake web page created by the attacker (Cache, Wright, and Liu 2010). 
The fake web page can be a cloned version of the real web page that steals sensitive 
information, or it can contain malware that infects the victim. DNS spoofing also makes it 
possible to redirect and monitor e-mail traffic.  
2.2  Internet Service Providers 
The four largest Internet service providers in Norway are Telenor, NextGenTel, Get and 
Ventelo. Together they have a 74.2 % market share of Norwegian broadband subscriptions 
(PT 2011). Telenor has 48.8 %, NextGenTel 10.9 %, Get 10.3 % and Ventelo 4.2 %.  
Most ISPs in Norway have a bundle that includes a wireless router when distributing 
broadband to their customers. In order to simplify the installation process, they often deliver 
the wireless routers preconfigured. Because the ISPs for several years have configured them 
to use WEP encryption, I expect there to be a significant number of such routers active. In the 
current practice, however, most ISPs configure their routers to use WPA-PSK encryption and 
attach the passphrase on a sticker underneath.  
This practice of bundling wireless routers with broadband subscriptions has become quite 
customary. NextGenTel, for instance, estimates
12
 to have delivered wireless routers to about 
70 % of their broadband customers. That means that they have delivered 132 000 
preconfigured WLANs in Norway, based on their 188 000 total broadband subscriptions (PT 
2011). I will now show an example on how preconfigured routers can be problematic. 
2.2.1 Vulnerable Thomson SpeedTouch Routers 
In April 2008, Kevin Devine (2008) published a method on how to find the default WEP 
password on preconfigured Thomson SpeedTouch routers from only the SSID. Devine had 
obtained a copy of the setup wizard distributed on CDs in Spain by the French 
telecommunications company Orange. By reverse engineering this file he was able to find the 
link between serial number, SSID and password. Devine then created a tool that allowed users 
to look up SSID and retrieve the password. In the source code comments of this tool he has 
provided the following example with the serial number CP0615JT109 (53): 
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The format of a serial number: 
CP YY WW PP XXX (CC) 
[…] 
Remove the CC and PP values: CP0615109 
Convert the “XXX” values to hexadecimal: CP0615313039 
Process with SHA-1: 742da831d2b657fa53d347301ec610e1ebf8a3d0 
The last 3 bytes are converted to 6 byte string, and appended to the word “SpeedTouch” which becomes 
the default SSID: SpeedTouchF8A3D0 
The first 5 bytes are converted to a 10 byte string which becomes the default WEP/WPA key: 
742DA831D2 
(Devine 2008) 
Devine’s tool is simply using brute-forcing to return the password when given the 6 byte 
string of the SSID. Due to convenience and the tool’s simplicity there are now PHP versions 
on multiple web pages so that it no longer requires a download. The tool has also been ported 
to mobile platforms such as iOS and Android. 
The largest Internet service provider in Norway, Telenor, has since 2003 offered various 
wireless routers to home users that subscribe to their broadband service (Telenor 2010). 
Thomson SpeedTouch is one brand they have used, and many customers are therefore 
affected by the vulnerability mentioned above. 
2.3  Security and Privacy in Households, Enterprises and Society 
Insecure WLANs pose risks to many different security aspects. By the term insecure I refer to 
wireless networks that can be exploited due to insufficient encryption. The term will primarily 
be applied to unencrypted and WEP-encrypted networks, but also to networks with weak 
WPA passphrases or vulnerable routers. Inspired by Top 10 Wireless Network Risks by the 
risk assessment firm Altius IT (2010), in this subchapter I will present notable risks that are 
faced by both enterprises and private users. 
 Bandwidth theft – While perhaps not the most damaging risk, bandwidth theft is very 
common on unencrypted networks. Unauthorized users can steal Internet bandwidth to 
download content such as music, video and games, and thus be limiting the experience 
and productivity for authorized users. In a poll conducted in the United States in 
December 2010 for the Wi-Fi Alliance, 32 % of the respondents admitted to having 
10 
 
attempted to connect to someone else’s network – an increase of 18 percentage points 
from a December 2008 poll (Wi-Fi Alliance 2011).  
 Masquerade – Hiding under the name (in this case IP address) of the broadband owner 
could give access to services and benefits which should not be available to others. 
 Reputation – Even a relatively innocent breach on an organization’s wireless network 
could be damaging to the company’s reputation if the breach becomes publicly known. 
 Confidentiality – Wireless networks are often connected to in-house private networks. 
This may allow an intruder to bypass hardware firewalls between the private network 
and the broadband connection. 
 Litigation risks – If an intruder uses the internet connection to conduct illegal actions 
such as distributing pirated software or child pornography, an investigation would 
trace the actions back to the wireless network and not the perpetrator. Obviously this 
also applies if the internet connection is used for malicious purposes such as hacking
13
 
or Denial of Service attacks. There are many incidents where WLAN owners have 
gotten in trouble due to criminal actions performed through their Internet connection. 
A recent example was reported by the Associated Press in April 2011, where a man in 
Buffalo, New York, got his home raided by federal agents with assault weapons 
(Thompson 2011). Convinced he was a paedophile, they took away his computer, 
iPads and iPhones to investigate. Within three days the investigators determined the 
homeowner was innocent. A week later, agents arrested a 25-year-old neighbour and 
charged him with distribution of child pornography. AP reports in the same article of 
two other incidents in 2009 and 2010 of similar character. 
 Clear text – A large amount of information on wireless networks is transmitted in 
clear and unencrypted text. This makes it possible for an intruder to use a packet 
analyzer to gain access to confidential data such as e-mail accounts and web browser 
activity. Basically it lets the intruder monitor everything that is being transmitted over 
the network. This is commonly done through a man-in-the-middle attack which is 
illustrated in Figure 2.1 below. 
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Figure 2.1 – MITM attack (Carpenter and Barrett 2008, 447) 
 Rogue access points – Wireless access points installed on a company’s network 
without explicit authorization. It can also refer to fake access points created by an 
adversary to monitor data traffic through man-in-the-middle attacks. 
 Information sensitivity – Sensitive information such as client lists and trade secrets 
should not be accessible through wireless networks.  
2.3.1 Criminal WLAN Exploitation 
October 25, 2011, the Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation ran a documentary on the TV 
channel NRK that demonstrated how simple breaking into encrypted wireless networks really 
is. In this documentary Hans-Peder Torgersen, Assistant Chief of Police at Kripos
14
, 
explained that they investigate several cases related to WLAN security. He said that criminals, 
typically in drug-related cases, use wireless networks to communicate with each other. In 
cases concerning sexual abuse, Torgersen pointed out that pictures and other content have 
been distributed through wireless networks. He also mentioned that threat messages are being 
sent out via WLANs.  
The documentary, which partially took place in Sweden, also showed how easy it is to 
monitor the data traffic on networks that are unencrypted or broken into. To find out the 
magnitude of credit card trading they visited an online chat channel made for this purpose. 
The first contact that responded to their request to buy Swedish credit card information 
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claimed that he had sold 160 Swedish credit cards that day. The journalist in the documentary 
bought the information for one Swedish credit card and it turned out to be perfectly valid.  
2.3.1.1 Consequence of a WLAN Breach 
In July 2005, one of the largest known theft of credit cards began outside a Marshalls clothing 
store in Minnesota (Pereira 2007). According to Joseph Pereira with the Wall Street Journal, 
investigators believe “hackers pointed a telescope-shaped antenna toward the store and used a 
laptop computer to decode data streaming through the air between hand-held price-checking 
devices, cash registers and the store’s computers” (2007). This helped them retrieve at least 
45.7 million stored credit and debit cards numbers from the central database of the clothing 
store chain’s parent, TJX Companies, Inc. While a person familiar with the internal 
investigation claimed the number could be as high as 200 million, TJX denied this but 
admitted at the same time that they might never know precisely. Apparently TJX deleted the 
logs and was unable to crack the encryption on files left on the system by the hackers. In 
addition, the perpetrators also got access to 451 000 customers’ personal information such as 
driver’s license numbers, military identification and Social Security numbers.  
According to Pereira, TJX was using the obsolete WEP encryption for their wireless 
networks. At the time of the breach, this encryption could easily be cracked within half an 
hour. Forrester Research analyst, Khalid Kark, expected the breach could cost TJX 
Companies Inc. somewhere between $500 million and possibly approach $1 billion (Kerber 
2007). On the other hand, Sharon Gaudin (2007) reported in InformationWeek that IPLocks, a 
database security firm, estimated that the bill could reach as high as $4.5 billion ($100 per lost 
record). Both these estimations were done considering the initial number of stored payment 
card numbers at 45.7 million. Two years later, Reuters reported that the main perpetrator in 
the TJX case stole “more than 170 million” payment card numbers from different sources 
until he was sentenced to 20 years in prison in March 2010 (Finkle and Wahba 2009; Weil 
2010).   
Privacy Commissioner Jennifer Stoddart said that TJX “collected too much personal 
information, kept it too long and relied on weak encryption technology to protect it — putting 
the privacy of millions of its customers at risk" (Jewell 2007). Even though credit card 
associations have declined to disclose the total damages from the thefts, some banks have said 
that fraudulent purchases were conducted as far away as Sweden and Hong Kong (Jewell 
2007).  
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In a paper from the wireless security company AirDefense Inc, now acquired by Motorola, 
several other retail data breaches involving wireless are exemplified (Sinha 2007). The author 
points out that “many data breaches are never reported as organizations try to minimize the 
negative publicity and business impact that would result from it” (Sinha 2007, 4). 
2.4 National and Societal Security Issues 
In 2002, the Norwegian Ministry of Justice and the Police
15
 published a White Paper on 
national security that contained topics on safety measures and crisis management. In pursuant 
to §6.2.1, economic growth and welfare have been concurrent with the expansion of 
information and communications technology (ICT), and production and operations 
management in most social sectors is based on such technology (Ministry of Justice and the 
Police 2002). The White Paper further states that this dependency has made the society more 
vulnerable and that a functional ICT is of great importance to crisis management. 
In their annual threat assessment for 2011, the Norwegian Police Security Service (PST)
16
 
reported that illegal intelligence services in Norway “are showing an increased interest in, and 
capacity for, exploiting the opportunities with cyber-intelligence” (PST 2011, 10). 
Opportunities are in this case referred to as retrieving sensitive information and acts of 
sabotage towards our digital society. The PST anticipates increasingly more sophisticated 
endeavours from foreign states against Norwegian computer networks. The assessment 
reported that computer network operations is of growing importance in assisting the 
intelligence services into retrieving sensitive information from both private and public sector 
in Norway.  
NorCERT (The Norwegian Computer Emergency Response Team) reported in November 
2011 that they handle 500 attacks on Norwegian computer systems every month (Staveland 
2011). Assistant Director, Jeanette Tjaberg, pointed out that mobile phones, social media and 
tablets have made us more vulnerable to computer attacks than ever before. She also said that 
even though the threat level has increased significantly, there are few signs of improvement in 
security (Staveland 2011). Also Secretary General in ICT-Norway, Per Morten Hoff, is 
frustrated by the current situation. He has claimed that public computer security in Norway is 
simply a deception (Staveland 2011).  
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2.5 Similar Studies 
Several researchers have already covered the flaws in the encryption aspects concerning 
wireless networks. The most notable is Weaknesses in the Key Scheduling Algorithm of RC4 
by Fluhrer, Mantin and Shamir (2001), a paper that was the beginning of today’s complete 
breakdown of WEP encryption. Since then there have been several articles and books on 
exploiting the mentioned RC4 and more recently the encryption protocol TKIP. Due to the 
extensive research already done on these topics, I do not elaborate on the technical encryption 
details in this thesis. Instead, I have presented the security protocols superficially as they are 
the foundation for any research on WLAN security. I will now present studies that are more 
closely related to my own research.  
Hole, Dyrnes and Thorsheim (2005) gathered WLAN data in Bergen in 2004. Their research 
was conducted in “the city center, which contains many shops and small businesses; 
Kokstad/Sandsli, an area close to the airport with large businesses; and Fyllingsdalen, a 
location outside the city centre with many large office buildings” (Hole, Dyrnes, and 
Thorsheim 2005, 29). Out of the 706 WLANs they detected by war-walking and war-driving, 
more than 500 were in city centre. By the terms war-walking and war-driving they refer to 
walking or driving with a portable computer in search of multiple wireless networks. Their 
article also says that 244 of the 706 networks were using WEP, but does not mention how 
many were using WPA. Thorsheim explained
17
 that this was because the software they used at 
the time did not separate between WEP and WPA. If they came across any WPA encryption, 
it was probably a rarity as WPA was introduced the same year they did the research, and the 
encryption was not supported in older operating systems such as Windows 95 (NETGEAR 
2011). Hole, Dyrnes and Thorsheim could not with certainty conclude that the remaining 462 
networks “transmit in the clear” (2005, 29). However, random spot checks strongly indicated 
that many WLANs did not have any form of encryption.  
While no similar war-drive has been publicly presented in Norway since then, internationally 
the situation is different. A notable study of WLAN security is conducted by PISA 
(Professional Information Security Association) and WTIA (Hong Kong Wireless Technology 
Industry Association) every year since 2002 in Hong Kong (PISA and WTIA 2011). Their 
latest research from December 2010 showed that 34 % of the WLANs they detected were 
using WEP encryption. Although it is a large decrease from 45 % in 2009, they point out that 
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they are far from satisfied due to the simplicity of cracking WEP. Unencrypted networks went 
down only 2 percentage points to 14 %, but WPA/WPA2 went from 39 % to 52 %. Overall 
they concluded with “some improvement in WLAN security implementation in Hong Kong” 
over the previous year (PISA and WTIA 2011, 17). Additionally, the total number of detected 
access points was 16 462 – a slight increase from 15 753 in 2009. Only 7 388 WLANs were 
detected in 2008. 
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3   RESEARCH Method 
In this thesis I make use of the quantitative research method which consists of “the collection 
of data in numerical form for quantitative analysis” (Jupp 2006, 250). The data obtained 
through this method is converted to numerical values through measurement methods such as 
counting and scaling (Punch 2005). As a result, comparisons are possible and the findings can 
be subject to statistical analysis. 
To discover the scope of insecure WLANs I decided to use a quantitative sampling method to 
gather access point data in five cities in different geographical parts of Norway. In this 
chapter I explain the practical process and the reasons behind the selection of geographical 
areas to research. I also present the methods I employed to gather the data and the limitations 
and ethical concerns I encountered during the process.  
3.1  Locations of Data Sampling 
In my research I decided to focus on city centres where I was likely to find a high WLAN 
density. In some cases I was able to use the municipalities’ own area plans as guidance to 
what was considered their city centre. Especially Bergen, Kristiansand and Tromsø provided 
good information and maps for this (Iversen 2011; Aardal 2011; Ledingham 2010). In some 
of the cities I also did research in additional areas with high population density. 
Limited time and resources required me to make a strategic decision about where to collect 
my data material. The five cities I chose were Oslo, Bergen, Kristiansand, Tromsø and 
Flekkefjord. Oslo is the capital of Norway and with a population of 592 000 citizens, the 
largest city in Norway. It also has the highest population density. Bergen is the second largest 
city with 258 000 citizens and consequently largest on the west coast. With its 68 000 
citizens, Tromsø is the largest city in the northern Norway, and Kristiansand is the largest city 
in the south with 82 000 citizens. Contrary to the rest of the cities in the selection, Flekkefjord 
is a small town with only 9 000 citizens.  
The choice of cities was based on their location and population size. The capital, Oslo, was a 
natural choice due to its size, status and eastern location. While there are two large cities in 
the western part of Norway, namely Stavanger and Bergen, I chose the latter because it is 
larger and also the city where I currently live. In the northern part of Norway I chose Tromsø 
over the quite larger Trondheim for a couple reasons. First of all, Tromsø is more than 1 000 
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kilometres north of Trondheim and is thus a better representative for the northern population. 
Secondly, the practicality of having acquaintances in Tromsø who knew the city would be 
beneficial in terms of gathering network data in an efficient manner. In the south, 
Kristiansand was a natural choice due to its population size and the structural layout of the 
streets in the city centre. Despite its 110 kilometre proximity to Kristiansand, the last city I 
chose was my hometown Flekkefjord. As I lived there for almost 20 years, it was easy to 
decide in what areas to gather access point information. For that reason I also conducted 
initial testing in Flekkefjord to be able to gather data effectively and efficiently.  
3.2 War-walking and Technical Equipment 
Even though other research methods such as interviews or surveys were possible, tools that 
automatize the method of gathering WLAN data return a larger amount of raw data material. 
It would also have been possible to get information from data collected by others, but doing it 
myself gave me several advantages compared to the alternative. Wigle
18
 is an example of a 
source with user-submitted data, where its database contains more than 50 million access 
points worldwide. But no removal of old submissions and not separating between encryption 
protocols were two critical reasons why I could not use its data. There were three factors that 
made me want to gather the data the way I did. First of all, I could choose the areas to conduct 
my research. While there are articles that present systematic data collections of access point 
information, these have rarely been conducted in Norway. Secondly, I would get all the raw 
data possible and thus be able to look for other interesting material and anomalies. Thirdly, 
my method of gathering data would be more relevant because it would be recent and 
conducted in a relatively short time span. 
While I could have used vehicles to cover a greater area and collect data from a larger number 
of WLANs, I mainly walked and prioritized network density instead. The reason for this was 
that I expect that in most scenarios where there is a security breach on a wireless network, the 
attack is likely coming from a neighbouring perpetrator. Commencing an attack from 
outdoors in open areas with few houses are also more likely to look suspicious. In addition, in 
areas with high WLAN density an attacker could receive sensitive information from more 
sources simultaneously than in areas with low density. Gathering data by foot also allowed me 
to detect wireless networks in areas unavailable to vehicles. 
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However, deciding how much time to spend on gathering data was not an easy task. Even 
though covering a big area could have been faster by using motorized vehicles, it would also 
have shown fewer wireless networks per distance. This is because wireless access points in 
Europe broadcasts on 13 different channels. In order to receive the information I needed, my 
wireless interface controllers (WLAN cards) had to listen on every channel for a certain 
period of time (Carpenter and Barrett 2008). Passing an access point in high speed could 
therefore cause my setup not to see the access point. I intended to reduce this problem by 
using two network cards and thereby be listening on two different channels simultaneously. 
Nevertheless, my tests and the aforementioned reasons led me to choose war-walking as the 
main method of data sampling.  
3.2.1 Data Sampling: War-walking 
In practice, my research was conducted by war-walking with a laptop computer, an extra 
battery, a USB connected GPS and two WLAN cards. USB connection for the GPS was 
specifically chosen over Bluetooth interface due to the potential interference in the 2.4 GHz 
spectrum. The GPS was pinpointing my positions where I detected the various access points 
and proved helpful in my analysis of the data afterwards. I decided to keep the laptop, WLAN 
cards and antennas inside a bag to avoid unsettling bystanders, and to be able to gather data 
without being interfered. Because the GPS device was much more discrete it allowed me to 
have it attached on the outside of the bag, which presumably made the reception better. 
Forcing the Wi-Fi antennas to work through an extra layer is not ideal, but I decided the 
minimal loss of gain to be an acceptable compromise. Due to the nature of the research I 
conducted I believe this compromise had little impact on my results. 
 
Figure 3.1 – Bag containing GPS, 2 dBi and 7 dBi omnidirectional antennas 
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3.2.2 Data Sampling: Hardware 
For convenience purposes I used a small netbook with 9” screen with a battery that lasted 5 
hours. I expected this to be sufficient for a single day, but I also brought a two-hour battery 
for unexpected circumstances. The two different network cards I used both had the 
RTL8187L chipset from Realtek which performs very well in Linux. Unfortunately this 
chipset is only operating at 2.4 GHz frequencies and will not see access points that are only 
broadcasting at 5 GHz. This means that the new 802.11n access points that are only 
broadcasting at 5 GHz, as well as access points set to the old 802.11a standard, will not be 
detected by my network cards. Fortunately, most 802.11n WLANs only support 2.4 GHz and 
the dual band ones are typically broadcasting on both 2.4 GHz and 5 GHz simultaneously. At 
the time of my war-walk, 802.11n chipsets were poorly supported in war-walking software. 
With these two network cards, I used an omnidirectional antenna with 2 dBi gain on one card 
and a 7 dBi omnidirectional antenna on the other card. Omnidirectional simply means a 360-
degree horizontal radiation pattern, and gain is a measurement of directionality (Carpenter and 
Barrett 2008). While a 7 dBi antenna reaches relatively far, it is not good at picking up access 
points located on higher floors. There are, however, cases where WLANs on very high floors 
can be detected if their Radio Frequency (RF) signal is being reflected downwards. For 
instance will drywalls and windows absorbs less dB than concrete and metal (Carpenter and 
Barrett 2008). A 2 dBi antenna is better for detecting WLANs on higher floors, but does not 
reach as far horizontally as an antenna with higher gain. So by using two different antennas I 
would in theory detect more access points. Cisco Systems, Inc. (2007) compares this antenna 
radiation pattern to what happens when placing pressure on the top and bottom of a balloon. 
In doing so, the balloon will expand in an outward direction and cover more horizontal space 
and at the same time reduce vertical space. I made an illustration of this below in Figure 3.2: 
 
Figure 3.2 – Antenna coverage based on dB. For illustrative purposes only 
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3.2.3 Access Point Detection Software 
In quantitative research, the use of software is beneficiary due to the magnitude of raw data 
material in need of post-processing (Marczyk, DeMatteo, and Festinger 2005). For my study, 
I used the Linux distribution Ubuntu and the open source software Kismet
19
 to gather the 
wireless data packets. Kismet is an “802.11 wireless network detector, sniffer, and intrusion 
detection system” (Kershaw 2011). This software allowed me to automate the search for 
wireless access points and simultaneously save their GPS location. In addition, using a Linux 
distribution made it possible to set the network cards into monitor mode, which makes it 
possible to perform passive scanning in Kismet (Cache, Wright, and Liu 2010). Tools that can 
perform passive scanning only listen to the surrounding data packets and never transmit 
anything. This leads to better results than if I was to use a scanner in Windows such as 
NetStumbler where support for monitor mode is absent (Cache, Wright, and Liu 2010).  
Kismet also let me have one network card listen on one channel and the other network card on 
another. As I used the default rate of hopping through 3 channels per second, in practice it 
meant 6 channels per second because of the two network cards. I also configured Kismet to 
stay longer on channels 1, 6 and 11 which are the most common by far. Overall, the Operating 
System and software I used to detect access points proved to be useful and consistent.  
3.3  Documentary Data  
Written historical and contemporary documents are important sources of information within 
social research. “In conjunction with other data, documents can be important in triangulation, 
where an intersecting set of different methods and data types is used in a single project” 
(Denzin 1989 in Punch 2005, 184). In my case, my documentary sources of data included 
expert statements, government papers, official statistics and online discussion forums.  
The war-walk I conducted was intended to answer questions I had related to WLAN security 
in Oslo, Bergen, Tromsø, Kristiansand and Flekkefjord. While it answered most of my 
questions, including giving me a large amount of information concerning preconfigured 
routers from the ISPs, it was not sufficient. For that reason I had to seek information directly 
from the Internet service providers as well as from additional sources. 
When researching ISP encryption practices I tried getting the information directly from the 
companies’ spoke persons. While I had e-mail correspondences with Telenor, Canal Digital, 
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NextGenTel, Ventelo and GET, it was limited as to what they were willing to reveal due to 
the sensitivity of the subject. This led me into retrieving supplementary data from media, 
online discussion forums and through private conversations via Internet Relay Chat (IRC).  
To find relevant information on WLAN encryption usage in Norway, I started out by 
searching through academic databases, master’s theses, various web pages and other relevant 
sources. As I found little research done on WLANs in Norway, I contacted several institutions 
and persons connected to ICT security. While none of them were aware of related work, there 
was a large amount of interest towards my research. I also contacted Hole, Dyrnes and 
Thorsheim to get more information about their research from 2004, but their raw data was 
unfortunately not available anymore.  
3.4  Preparation of Data 
Collected data material should be “organized into a database that will facilitate accurate and 
efficient statistical analysis” (Marczyk, DeMatteo, and Festinger 2005, 199). Consequently, to 
be able to analyse my data in an efficient manner, I initially created a Java-based tool that 
parsed information from the raw files made by Kismet. I then discovered the python 
application GISKismet
20
, which stores the data from Kismet into a SQLite database (Cache, 
Wright, and Liu 2010). Being able to use SQL queries simplified the process of analysing the 
data material considerably. The database contained the following variables: SSID, MAC 
address of router, manufacturer, broadcast channel, cloaked/visible, encryption, first and last 
time seen, minimum and maximum in addition to best (measured from signal reception) 
latitude, longitude and altitude. The database also contained more technical details, as well as 
MAC address and manufacturer of clients connected to the networks. For the post processing 
analysis I used SQLite Expert Personal
21
 to run the SQL queries. This software proved very 
useful in looking for patterns and irregularities in WLAN security practice.  
GISKismet also lets you use the Kismet logs to create files that show the access points in a 
graphical view on Google Earth, and I used this graphical view to verify the exact routes I 
took when gathering data. In addition to the GPS data from Kismet, I used the smartphone 
application RunKeeper that also logged my positions via GPS. This made it possible to have 
location data available even if the logging system in Kismet were to fail. I also considered a 
more practical alternative in the iPhone application WiFiFoFum, presented by Cache, Wright 
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and Liu (2010) in Hacking Exposed Wireless: Wireless Security Secrets & Solutions. But after 
some testing I found that Kismet, combined with good wireless equipment on a notebook, 
detected significantly more WLANs. 
I originally intended to present the wireless networks graphically. Figure 3.3 below is an 
example from the GISKismet web page that shows how WLANs can be represented in 
Google Earth. The various colours of the circles indicate the encryption being used.  
 
Figure 3.3 – WLAN representation example from the GISKismet web page 
However, I decided that protection of privacy had to be preserved. Instead of doing a 
compromise of scrambling information such as SSID or GPS position that could identify the 
WLAN owners, I opted for a map visualisation of routes and areas I covered. This would also 
circumvent potential erroneous GPS readings caused by the urban canyon effect. In order to 
measure the distance of the routes, I used Google Maps’ Distance Measurement Tool. This 
tool calculates the distance of drawn lines in Google Maps, and allowed me to estimate 
WLAN density in the various locations. To be sure of reliable estimates I compared these 
measurements to the distance results I got from RunKeeper. 
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3.5  Reliability and Validity 
In order to support and consolidate my study and findings, this sub-chapter explores the 
reliability and validity of my research. I will first present reliability and its correlation to my 
research, followed by three categories of validity. 
3.5.1 Reliability 
Reliability depends on the accuracy and consistency of gathering data and its post-processing 
(Johannessen, Tufte, and Kristoffersen 2004). A reliable measurement returns a lesser chance 
of the results being prone to random factors and measurement error. Hence, the need for 
stable hardware and software, as well as testing rounds, is imperative. Johannesen, Tufte and 
Kristoffersen (2004) explain that a common testing method to check for data reliability is to 
repeat the research on the same group, for instance after 2-3 weeks. If the results are the same, 
the data has high reliability. This testing method in particular is called test-retest reliability. 
There is also high reliability if other researchers who investigate the same phenomena retrieve 
the same results. The term for this is inter-rater reliability (Johannessen, Tufte, and 
Kristoffersen 2004). 
The unforeseen aspects of wireless technology would prevent some networks from being seen 
in a second run, but would also find networks I did not find in the first run. Such aspects 
include uncontrollable factors such as weather (even though its impact is mild) and moving 
objects such as cars and humans. Nevertheless, the encryption usage ratios should be fairly 
accurate. In terms of hardware and software, I already possessed knowledge regarding 
compatibility and the wireless equipment that would return accurate results. Furthermore, 
both the chipset (RTL8187L) and the software (Kismet and GISKismet) I used were 
recommended in Hacking exposed wireless: wireless security secrets & solutions by Cache, 
Wright and Liu (2010). 
Even though I planned the routes thoroughly, it is evident that I could not register all access 
points in the areas and that there were several factors that had influence on my research. 
Firstly, as my research was conducted outside and included electronic equipment I was 
relying on good weather. Even though it was possible to gather data while it was mildly 
raining or snowing, I faced some difficulties when I needed to modify configurations or 
making sure everything was working properly. Another factor is that heavy rain and snow 
affects RF signals, and could in theory reduce the number of detected access points (Carpenter 
and Barrett 2008). 
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Secondly, access points have limited broadcast range and the signal strength can also be 
manually reduced to keep the wireless packets within the building. Thick walls and a poor 
placement of the access point can also make it difficult for outside war-walking. In addition, 
access points do not handle broadcasting to different floors very well. Influencing variables 
are chipsets used, bitrate, weather, wall material, objects in between and so on (Carpenter and 
Barrett 2008). Such variables make it impossible to do an estimation of what floors I was able 
to see access points on. While it could be possible to see an access point on the 10
th
 floor 
because the signal is bouncing of a neighbouring house, an access point on 2
nd
 floor, 
obstructed by concrete, could be unreachable. 
Thirdly, while I used two network cards and different antennas, I still needed to cycle through 
the broadcasting channels to be able to find the networks. The optimal solution to avoid this 
would be to use one network card for each of the 13 channels. But having 13 different 
network cards and antennas in a small bag would not only be chaotic, but also create a large 
amount of heat. Packing such equipment close together also reduces its reception potential. It 
would be possible for that type of war-driving setup in a vehicle, but this prevents search for 
networks in narrow streets and alleys. 
Fourthly and finally, because my research was based on gathering data in an unobtrusive 
manner, my results only show the encryption broadcasted by the access points. This means 
that even if the wireless network had encryption at layer 3 such as VPN, it would not show in 
my results. Connecting to a network in order to retrieve such information is illegal without the 
consent of the WLAN owner. 
All these factors show that in this kind of research the technical equipment has great 
importance for the gained results. Therefore, if the research was to be repeated in order to 
ensure reliability, similar equipment and data collection method should be employed. If the 
control sampling is done within a short time span and follows my recommendations, I believe 
the results would be similar to mine and have high reliability as such.  
3.5.2 Validity 
Data validity refers to how well the gathered data is representing the researched phenomena. 
The term poses the question “are we measuring what we intend to measure?” (Johannessen, 
Tufte, and Kristoffersen 2004, 195). I will now present three commonly used categories of 
data validity. 
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3.5.2.1 Construct Validity 
Construct validity concerns the relation between the research subject and the specific data 
measured (Johannessen, Tufte, and Kristoffersen 2004). Regarding my research and my first 
research question on encryption usage on WLANs, this refers to how well war-walking/war-
driving is accurate in establishing WLAN security practice. It also refers to my approach to 
discovering information about the ISP’s practices.  
Prior to gathering access point data I contacted the Data Inspectorate
22
 and the Norwegian 
Post and Telecommunications Authority
23
, enquiring about WLAN security practice and 
similar research. This led to referrals to various persons such as university professors and 
Telenor employees. Trying to find statistics and usable data I also contacted other 
organizations such as the Norwegian Centre for Information Security
24
 (NorSIS). None of 
these sources returned relevant data. The lack of existing data for my first research question 
led me into conducting the war-walk/war-drive in order to retrieve valuable information 
regarding WLAN security. I considered other approaches such as surveys and interviews, but 
the amount of unique user data would be insufficient. I would also have faced difficulties in 
that security questions about wireless access points are rather technical, and answers could 
consequently be lacking in detail.  
In cases where the relation between research method and expected result appears convincing, 
the term face validity is used (Johannessen, Tufte, and Kristoffersen 2004). In this thesis, war-
walking as a research method has face validity when it comes to establishing WLAN 
encryption usage.  
3.5.2.2 Internal Validity 
“A study has internal validity to the extent that the data support conclusions about the 
hypothesis in the specific instance studied” (Stern and Kalof 1996, 62). In other words, 
internal validity refers to the validity of the conclusions in general, regarding whether or not 
they are rightfully drawn from the data material. For instance, in my thesis I will draw 
conclusions from the data material I have gathered regarding security issues and user 
practices. I will carefully go through the process towards these conclusions in order to ensure 
the validity of them. In order to explore end-user reasoning in terms of WLAN security, the 
most appropriate research method would have been a qualitative research, including 
                                                 
22
 Datatilsynet. 
23
 Post- og teletilsynet. 
24
 Norsk senter for Informasjonssikring. 
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interviews. But as end-user reasoning is not the main focus of this thesis, I decided that the 
potential end product would not weigh up for the time and resources spent. I will, however, 
include a discussion concerning both assumptions and speculation on user practices regarding 
WLAN security. 
Regarding my second research question on how ISPs are affecting the situation, some 
conclusions are drawn from personal correspondences and documentary data such as articles 
and statistics. However, the majority of the conclusions are based on the research data 
retrieved from war-walking. I also combined these approaches in order to enhance the validity 
of my findings through data triangulation. The validity increases by matching the data from 
the war-walk to the documentary data (Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias 2008). 
Internal validity also refers to the extent to which the gained results show a causal relationship 
between the variables (Johannessen, Tufte, and Kristoffersen 2004). Even though my research 
is primarily a descriptive study, cause-effect relations are apparent in research questions 1b 
and 3a where location, population size and time are variables that affect my findings. For 
instance, there is a causal relation between preconfigured access points and encryption 
strength. Nonetheless, these occurrences can be affected by end-users and have therefore a 
lesser internal validity.  
3.5.2.3 External Validity 
External validity refers to the extent to which the data results can be held true to similar 
research with varying factors of location and time (Johannessen, Tufte, and Kristoffersen 
2004). As my research subject is changing rapidly in relation to technology expansion and 
internet dependency, a later similar research will have variations depending on growth of 
WLAN usage and change in security practices. Another factor is that the security focus could 
be stronger in areas with higher population density. Additionally, findings from gathering data 
similarly in other locations will be affected by the propagation of the various broadband 
providers who deliver preconfigured wireless access points.  
Even though my research shows certain patterns that might be valid for a greater area, my 
data sample is too small to generalize WLAN security on a national level.  I did, however, 
attempt to cover a typical selection of the Norwegian cities and some of their most populated 
areas. By doing this I believe I got a representative selection for real life scenarios of WLAN 
attacks. Therefore, through choosing a sample that reflects the characteristics of the 
population of interest, I attempted to ensure the external validity of my findings (Frankfort-
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Nachmias and Nachmias 2008). In this way, even though not generalizable, my findings 
should give a pointer on the current security situation. Furthermore, the problems and 
solutions discussed in this thesis are relevant in every society with wireless networks. 
3.6  Ethical Concerns 
As my research concerned sensitive and security-related data, it was important not to cross 
ethical or legal boundaries. Additionally, because this research was done without consent 
from the WLAN owners, issues of privacy, anonymity and confidentiality were essential 
(Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias 2008).  
Prior to the war-walk I needed to make sure that my research method would not interfere with 
network data traffic. I therefore set my network cards into monitor mode and configured 
Kismet to log only the public information the access points were broadcasting. To ensure that 
I did not log any traffic I contacted Mike Kershaw, the developer of Kismet, and he was kind 
enough to add a setting that filtered away the data payload. By enabling this setting, Kismet 
ignored all the user traffic and only retrieved the header showing the access point information 
I needed. In reality, this made it have less interference on the networks than most Operating 
Systems do when they are searching for WLANs to connect to. 
Subsequent to the war-walk I still possessed information that could be sensitive if treated 
improperly. The most obvious problem was the relation between location and SSID. This risk 
of identification, and consequent exposure of private home owners to criminal activity, was 
the reason why I refrained from including combinations of location and SSID together. In 
order to provide anonymity I needed to separate “the identity of individuals from the 
information they give” (Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias 2008, 78). 
In certain parts of this thesis it may appear as undisclosed information regarding WLAN 
security practices is being revealed. However, all data was gathered through either publicly 
available information sources online or through e-mail conversations with Internet providers’ 
spokespersons. No information was gathered through illegal or unethical channels. 
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4 RESEARCH FINDINGS: INSECURE WLANS 
AND VULNERABLE ISP ROUTERS 
With regard to my first research question, What is the current state of WLAN encryption in 
Norway?, I will start in this chapter by presenting an overview of the areas and routes where I 
detected wireless networks. I will then present the encryption data and show comparisons and 
patterns that form the foundation for the discussion chapter. Lastly, and in order to investigate 
my second research question, How are Internet service providers affecting the situation?, I 
will present data of potentially problematic wireless routers distributed by Norwegian ISPs. 
I am primarily focusing on unencrypted and WEP-encrypted networks because these pose the 
biggest threat. However, in the following results I will also include networks that for various 
reasons can be broken into, even if they use a stronger encryption. The data was gathered in 
the 4
th
 quarter of 2010.  
4.1  Routes of War-walking and War-driving  
While the war-walking routes were planned ahead, detours were taken if I discovered other 
areas that presumably had a high density of wireless networks. As previously mentioned, to 
measure the distance of the routes, I used the distance measurement tool in Google Maps. I 
will now present the routes taken and the results focusing on encryption protocols. By doing 
so I intend to show the wireless network encryption distribution and whether city population 
or location is an influencing factor. Note that WLANs are so widespread that I detected new 
access points every few metres on every street in every city. My findings are presented city-
by-city in order of population size. 
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4.1.1 Oslo 
 
Figure 4.1 – War-walking/war-driving route in Oslo 
The distance I covered in Oslo totalled to 47 kilometres. In average, for every 2.3 meters I 
detected a new WLAN. Due to the high number of business offices and retail stores in the city 
centre, I also used public transportation to reach areas further away. While I was walking in 
the areas around The Royal Palace, Majorstuen, Grønland, Torshov and St. Hanshaugen, I 
also took a bus that went up north to Nordberg that passed through several residential areas. 
Because a slower movement in theory detects more WLANs, it would be inaccurate to some 
extent to directly compare metres per network with other cities where I did not use vehicles. 
From the 20 552 WLANs I detected in Oslo, I got the following results: 
 12.9 % or 2 649 WLANs were unencrypted. 
 21.2 % or 4 356 WLANs had WEP encryption. 
 65.9 % or 13 547 WLANs had stronger encryption. 
o 12 624 used PSK. 
o  923 used 802.1X. 
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4.1.2 Bergen 
 
Figure 4.2 – War-walking route in Bergen 
In Bergen I gathered WLAN information in the areas Møhlenpris, Nygårdshøyden, 
Grieghallen, Torgallmenningen and Nordnes. In these areas I found a total of 6 927 WLANs 
on a walked distance of 16 kilometres. That means that for every 2.3 metres I detected a new 
WLAN. 
From the 6 927 WLANs I detected in Bergen, I got the following results: 
 14.8 % or 1 028 WLANs were unencrypted. 
 19.1 % or 1 322 WLANs had WEP encryption. 
 66.1 % or 4 577 WLANs had stronger encryption. 
o 4 253 used PSK. 
o 324 used 802.1X. 
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4.1.3 Kristiansand 
 
Figure 4.3 – War-walking route in Kristiansand 
As Figure 4.3 shows, the city blocks in the centre of Kristiansand are shaped in a rectangular 
form. This made it easy to plan an efficient path to register a high number of WLANs. 
Through 7.6 kilometres of war-walking I found 2 230 wireless networks, meaning one access 
point for every 3.4 metres.   
From the 2 230 WLANs I detected in Kristiansand, I got the following results: 
 17.4 % or 387 WLANs were unencrypted. 
 23.7 % or 529 WLANs had WEP encryption. 
 58.9 % or 1 314 WLANs had stronger encryption. 
o 1 248 used PSK. 
o 66 used 802.1X. 
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4.1.4 Tromsø 
 
Figure 4.4 – War-walking/war-driving route in Tromsø 
The total distance I travelled while gathering data in Tromsø was 35 kilometres. As I found    
4 273 WLANs, I discovered a new one every 8.2 metres. However, I made two roundtrips of 
12 kilometres each from a housing cooperative in the north to the city centre in the south. I 
chose to include these overlapping roads when calculating the distance because additional 
wireless networks are discovered when routes are repeated. Therefore, retracting 12 
kilometres from the total 35 would not necessarily return a more accurate measurement of 
distance travelled per WLAN.  
From the 4 273 WLANs I detected in Tromsø, I got the following results: 
 17.0 % or 728 WLANs were unencrypted. 
 23.3 % or 997 WLANs had WEP encryption. 
 59.6 % or 2 548 WLANs had stronger encryption. 
o 2 238 used PSK. 
o 310 used 802.1X. 
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4.1.5 Flekkefjord 
 
Figure 4.5 – War-driving route in Flekkefjord 
Due to the lower density of private homes and WLANs in Flekkefjord I used a car for the 
entire distance of gathering data. After two hours of very slow driving I had gathered 
information about 1 212 wireless networks. As I calculated the total distance to be 31 
kilometres, a WLAN was detected every 25.6 metres. While gathering access points in Oslo, 
Bergen and Kristiansand could be performed without much overlapping of roads, many dead 
ends in Flekkefjord had an effect on the WLANs per metre ratio. For the same reason as in 
Tromsø, I chose to include the overlapping roads when measuring the distance driven.  
From the 1 212 WLANs I detected in Flekkefjord, I got the following results: 
 17.0 % or 206 WLANs were unencrypted. 
 33.2 % or 402 WLANs had WEP encryption. 
 49.8 % or 604 WLANs had stronger encryption. 
o 580 used PSK. 
o 24 used 802.1X. 
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4.2 Encryption Data 
I will now present comparisons in encryption usage between the cities. Table 4.1 shows the 
specific number of WLANs using the various encryptions. Chart 4.1 displays this in 
percentage to easier show the similarities. Finally, Chart 4.2 combines the number of 
networks from all cities and shows a clear majority of PSK + 802.1X. 
City Unencrypted WEP PSK 802.1X Total 
Oslo 2 649 4 356 12 624 923 20 552 
Bergen 1 028 1 322 4 253 324 6 927 
Kristiansand 387 529 1 248 66 2 230 
Tromsø 728 997 2 238 310 4 273 
Flekkefjord 206 402 580 24 1 212 
Total 4 998 7606 20943 1 647 35 194 
Table 4.1 – Encryption distribution in the sampled cities 
 
 
Chart 4.1 – Encryption distribution in the sampled cities, in percentage 
 
 
Chart 4.2 – Encryption distribution, insecure vs. more secure 
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In the following Table 4.2, I have placed unencrypted and WEP-encrypted networks in one 
category, and networks with PSK and 802.1X in another. My intention is to show that even 
though many wireless networks are relatively secure, an alarming amount is still insecure. 
City Unencrypted + WEP PSK + 802.1X 
Oslo 7 005 13 547 
Bergen 2 350 4 577 
Kristiansand 916 1 314 
Tromsø 1 725 2 548 
Flekkefjord 608 604 
Table 4.2 – Encryption distribution, Unencrypted+WEP vs. PSK+802.1X 
 
Chart 4.3 below does not only show that there is a very high percentage of insecure networks, 
but also a pattern of better encryption usage in larger cities.  
 
Chart 4.3 – Encryption distribution, Unencrypted+WEP vs. PSK+802.1X, in percentage 
 
4.2.1 Cloaked SSIDs 
Most wireless routers have the option to disable the broadcast of SSID. Disabling this setting 
requires the users to enter the SSID the first time they connect, instead of selecting it from a 
list. In this subchapter I will present encryption usage related to cloaked SSID, with the 
intention of establishing similarities or differences to visible networks. In the following tables 
I will show that the percentage of less secure networks tends to be higher if the network is 
cloaked. However, due to my relatively small data sample and the consequent low number of 
cloaked networks found in the cities (perhaps except for Oslo), my findings may not be 
completely representative. Nevertheless, I have chosen to include these results as there seems 
to be an interesting pattern. 
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In Oslo there were 844 routers out of 20 552 that had cloaked SSID. 84 of these were 
unencrypted and 246 used WEP.  
Oslo Visible Cloaked 
Unencrypted 13.0 % 10.0 % 
WEP 20.9 % 29.1 %  
WPA/WPA2 66.1 % 60.9 % 
Table 4.3 – Visible and cloaked networks in Oslo 
 
For Bergen the results were similar. I detected 272 cloaked WLANs out of 6 927, of which 60 
were unencrypted and 75 used WEP.  
Bergen Visible Cloaked 
Unencrypted 14.5 % 22.1 % 
WEP 18.7 % 27.6 % 
WPA/WPA2 66.8 % 50.3 % 
Table 4.4 – Visible and cloaked networks in Bergen 
 
Out of 2 230 WLANs in Kristiansand, 59 were cloaked. Only 5 of these were unencrypted 
and 23 used WEP.  
Kristiansand Visible Cloaked 
Unencrypted 17.6 % 8.5 %  
WEP 23.3 % 39.0 % 
WPA/WPA2 59.1 % 52.5 % 
Table 4.5 – Visible and cloaked networks in Kristiansand 
 
In Tromsø I detected 138 networks that were cloaked out of 4 273. 20 of these were 
unencrypted and 56 had WEP encryption.  
Tromsø Visible Cloaked 
Unencrypted 17.1 % 14.5 % 
WEP 22.8 % 40.6 % 
WPA/WPA2 60.1 % 44.9 % 
Table 4.6 – Visible and cloaked networks in Tromsø 
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Flekkefjord had only 16 cloaked WLANs out of a total 1 212. Out of these were 3 encrypted 
with WEP and 3 unencrypted. Note that the margin of error here is higher due to very few 
cloaked networks in Flekkefjord.  
Flekkefjord Visible Cloaked 
Unencrypted 17.0 % 18.8 %  
WEP 33.4 % 18.8 % 
WPA/WPA2 49.6 % 62.4 % 
Table 4.7 – Visible and cloaked networks in Flekkefjord 
In Chart 4.4 below it is apparent that in all the cities except for Flekkefjord, the use of WEP 
was more common if the network had cloaked SSID. For unencrypted networks the difference 
looks more variable. 
 
Chart 4.4 – Visible and cloaked networks in the sampled cities 
However, when looking at WEP and unencrypted combined in Chart 4.5 below, the use of 
insecure WLANs is more frequent when cloaking is enabled: 
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Naturally, and as presented in the following Chart 4.6, a more frequent use of insecure 
WLANs is still the case when looking at the networks gathered from all the cities combined. 
Out of the total 35 194 WLANs there were 1 329 with cloaked SSID.  
 
Chart 4.6 – Unencrypted+WEP for sampled cities combined, visible vs. cloaked 
4.2.2 Popular SSIDs 
Evidently, it is rather common to make use of wireless access points without changing the 
default network name. The following Table 4.8 shows the most common SSIDs I found and 
their distribution.  
SSID Oslo Bergen Kristiansand Tromsø Flekkefjord Total 
Dlink 401 96 65 94 57 713 
Linksys 209 59 41 59 83 451 
AirLink59300 239 68 31 66 11 415 
AirLink89300 190 70 23 65 11 359 
AirLink29150 200 46 19 25 7 297 
GIGABYTE 106 68 25 10 1 210 
NETGEAR 97 27 15 13 4 156 
3com 75 10 7 24 17 133 
Table 4.8 – Most common default SSIDs 
It is also common for businesses and institutions to have a broad spread of access points with 
identical network names. This is shown in Table 4.9 below. SSIDs such as telenor and 
wayport are wireless network portals that require subscriptions and logon credentials to be 
used. The SSIDs eduroam, UiB and skolenwpa2 belong to educational institutions. 
SSID Oslo Bergen Kristiansand Tromsø Flekkefjord Total 
eduroam 97 185 0 0 0 282 
wayport 131 45 36 62 0 274 
telenor 82 49 20 103 0 254 
UiB 0 190 0 0 0 190 
utsikt 101 0 0 0 0 101 
insikt 93 0 0 0 0 93 
skolenwpa2 81 0 0 0 0 81 
netpoint 42 0 34 0 0 76 
Table 4.9 – Most common SSIDs by businesses and institutions 
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4.2.3 Popular Manufacturers 
According to my war-walk, the following 8 access point manufacturers hold 70 % of the total 
market. Table 4.10 below shows that Cisco is the most common when considering Cisco’s 
subsidiary company, Linksys, which was acquired in 2003.  
Manufacturer Oslo Bergen Kristiansand Tromsø Flekkefjord Total 
D-Link Corp. 4 457 808 949 367 261 6 842 
Cisco 2 424 1 212 801 256 9 4 702 
Cisco-Linksys 1 845 430 322 242 214 3 053 
ZyXEL Com. 1 050 583 336 225 166 2 360 
Edimax Technology 1 090 449 243 135 54 1 971 
Thomson Telecom 993 477 173 131 84 1 858 
Inteno Broadband 579 855 86 101 41 1 662 
Apple Inc 940 231 80 52 4 1 307 
Table 4.10 – Most common manufacturers 
 
4.2.4 TKIP and CCMP 
Even though the TKIP encryption protocol, commonly used in WPA and WPA2, is not 
completely broken, flaws have been found that open for attacks. The following Chart 4.7 
shows the percentage of TKIP and CCMP in WPA and WPA2. For all the access points using 
WPA/WPA2, TKIP was used in 83 % and CCMP in the remaining 17 %. 
 
 
Chart 4.7 – TKIP and CCMP in WPA/WPA2 
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4.3  Internet Service Providers: Problematic Encryption Practices 
In this subchapter I intend to give an overview of the various SSIDs used by broadband 
providers. The purpose is to show the extensive distribution of preconfigured routers, and 
whether or not the end-users are likely to change the default settings. For convenience, I will 
in the following chapters use the variables in Table 4.11 to substitute characters in SSIDs. For 
instance will the SSID privat1234klm be written privatYYYYxxx. 
Variable Substitute Characters 
X uppercase alphabetic A-Z 
x lowercase alphabetic a-z 
Y digits 0-9 
Z uppercase hexadecimals 0-9  A-F 
z lowercase hexadecimals 0-9  a-f 
Q uppercase alphanumeric 0-9  A-Z 
q lowercase alphanumeric 0-9  a-z 
Table 4.11 – Variables substituting characters in SSIDs 
 
SSID Oslo Bergen Kristiansand Tromsø Flekkefjord Total 
privatZZZZZZ 439 148 77 129 59 852 
SpeedTouchZZZZZZ 63 56 9 6 7 141 
ThomsonZZZZZZ 53 0 0 0 0 53 
Total 555 204 86 135 66 1 046 
Table 4.12 – Circulation of WEP encryption in privatZ*, SpeedTouchZ* and ThomsonZ* 
Table 4.12 shows WEP-encrypted Thomson routers that use default SSID and are vulnerable 
to exploitation that does not require data packet monitoring. The following Chart 4.8 shows 
this comparison in percentage. 
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Chart 4.8 – Circulation of WEP-encrypted Thomson routers from ISPs in percentage 
 
Table 4.13 below shows the ISPs’ SSIDs I found that use WPA-PSK. Because of the certain 
possibility of cracking WEP, I have chosen not to include those networks below. 
SSID Oslo Bergen Kristiansand Tromsø Flekkefjord Total 
GETXXXX(X/XX)PRIVAT 1 090 7 34 0 0 1 131 
NextGenTel_ZZ 438 707 84 60 33 1 322 
privatYYYYxxx 841 462 180 283 145 1 911 
privatZZZZZZ 14 2 1 2 2 21 
SpeedTouchZZZZZZ 34 34 3 3 2 76 
Telenor-6YYYYYYY 45 16 4 10 0 75 
ThomsonZZZZZZ 55 4 1 0 0 60 
VenteloZZZZZZ 18 158 13 2 0 191 
Total 2 535 1 390 320 360 182 4 787 
Table 4.13 – ISP preconfigured routers with WPA-PSK 
 
Manufactured by Thomson
25
 SA, the WLANs above with SSID privatZ*
26
, SpeedTouchZ* 
and ThomsonZ*, have passphrases that in theory can be calculated in the way Kevin Devine 
discovered in 2008. However, reports by users on the web site GNUCITIZEN
27
, dating back 
to July 2010, claim that new routers are using a new algorithm.  
 
                                                 
25
 Thomson SA was re-branded Technicolor SA in 2010. In this thesis, however, I will use the Thomson name 
due to its wide recognition. 
26
 To facilitate readability I have substituted ZZZZZZ with Z*. 
27
 The GNUCITIZEN web page can be found at: http://www.gnucitizen.org/  
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4.3.1 ISP Routers: Altered or Unaltered Configuration 
Wireless routers and access points are generally without preconfigured encryption when sold 
retail. That means that the purchaser actively has to enable encryption when the wireless 
network is being installed. The consequence of routers and access points requiring an 
installation process is that the end-user chooses encryption and a custom SSID. When it 
comes to the broadband providers in Norway, they have had a tendency of choosing rather 
uncommon wireless routers. If a router has solely been distributed by ISPs and not sold retail, 
it is possible to get an estimation of configuration change by comparing the SSIDs to the 
manufacturer. I will now compare the tendency to use custom SSIDs, which refers to cloaked 
networks or alterations to the default SSID set in the configuration by the ISP or 
manufacturer. For the three most common router brands used by ISPs, default SSID refers to 
SpeedTouchZ*, ThomsonZ* and privatZ* for Thomson SpeedTouch, privatYYYYxxx for 
ZyXEL and NextGenTel_ZZ for Inteno.  
 
Chart 4.9 – Tendencies to alter SSID on SpeedTouch, ZyXEL and Inteno routers 
Chart 4.9 shows that altering the SSID is more common on SpeedTouch and Inteno routers 
than on ZyXEL. It also makes it evident that the majority of end-users that receive routers 
from their broadband providers do not alter the SSID. 
I will now present more detailed data that will assist in comprehending the alteration 
differences between the routers.  
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4.3.1.1 Thomson SpeedTouch 
Generally, wireless routers from Thomson SpeedTouch have been delivered through 
broadband providers, and have rarely been sold retail. Subtracting the ISPs’ common SSIDs 
from the total amount of Thomson routers, would therefore give an estimation of routers 
where the configuration has been modified by end-users.  
Encryption Oslo Bergen Kristiansand Tromsø Flekkefjord Total 
Unencrypted 50 44 11 4 7 116 
WEP 512 203 86 135 65 1 001 
WPA-PSK 102 40 5 5 4 156 
Total 664 287 102 144 76 1 273 
Table 4.14 – SpeedTouch routers with default SSID 
Encryption Oslo Bergen Kristiansand Tromsø Flekkefjord Total 
Unencrypted 10 4 1 1 0 16 
WEP 165 90 15 11 5 286 
WPA-PSK 197 131 17 24 5 374 
Total 372 225 33 36 10 676 
Table 4.15 – SpeedTouch routers with custom SSID 
Table 4.14 shows that there are many SpeedTouch routers in use with default SSID, and that 
most of them use WEP encryption. In Table 4.15 it is apparent that the encryption on 
SpeedTouch routers is better when users have changed or cloaked the SSID. 
 
Chart 4.10 – SpeedTouch encryption, default SSID vs. custom SSID 
Chart 4.10 shows a high majority of WEP encryption when the SpeedTouch router is using a 
default SSID. It also shows that when the SSID is custom, there is less use of WEP encryption 
and higher use of WPA-PSK.  
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4.3.1.2 ZyXEL 
As Telenor has used several different router models from ZyXEL Communications 
Corporation, both WEP and WPA-PSK have been employed. While there is a multitude of 
ZyXEL routers available in retail stores, Chart 4.9 showed that 84 % used the SSID 
privatYYYYxxx which originates from Telenor. 
 
Encryption Oslo Bergen Kristiansand Tromsø Flekkefjord Total 
Unencrypted 4 0 0 1 0 5 
WEP 186 69 35 58 36 384 
WPA-PSK 838 461 180 283 145 1 907 
Total 1 028 530 215 342 181 2 296 
Table 4.16 – ZyXEL routers with default SSID 
Encryption Oslo Bergen Kristiansand Tromsø Flekkefjord Total 
Unencrypted 20 22 1 9 1 53 
WEP 54 32 9 16 5 116 
WPA-PSK 119 72 36 37 10 274 
Total 193 126 46 62 16 443 
Table 4.17 – ZyXEL routers with custom SSID 
Table 4.16 shows there are very few ZyXEL routers with default SSID that use no encryption. 
It also shows that WPA-PSK is much more common than WEP. Table 4.17 shows that when 
the SSID has been changed on ZyXEL routers, there is a greater share of networks without 
encryption. 
 
Chart 4.11 – ZyXEL encryption, default SSID vs. custom SSID 
Contrary to the numbers from SpeedTouch routers, Chart 4.11 shows a higher percentage of 
unencrypted and WEP-encrypted routers with custom SSID, and a lower percentage of WPA-
PSK. 
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4.3.1.3 Inteno 
Inteno routers in Norway are distributed solely by NextGenTel and are not sold retail. 
Therefore, the wireless routers manufactured by Inteno that do not have SSID 
NextGenTel_ZZ, must have been altered by end-users. Additionally, because they are only 
delivered with WPA-PSK, Table 4.18 and Table 4.19 below give insight into end-user 
encryption practices when SSIDs have been changed. 
Encryption Oslo Bergen Kristiansand Tromsø Flekkefjord Total 
Unencrypted 3 1 0 0 0 4 
WEP 6 2 0 1 0 9 
WPA-PSK 438 706 83 60 33 1 320 
Total 447 709 83 61 33 1 333 
Table 4.18 – Inteno routers with default SSID 
Encryption Oslo Bergen Kristiansand Tromsø Flekkefjord Total 
Unencrypted 1 1 0 1 0 3 
WEP 33 27 2 2 0 64 
WPA-PSK 180 170 27 25 9 411 
Total 214 198 29 28 9 478 
Table 4.19 – Inteno routers with custom SSID 
Table 4.18 shows that almost all Inteno routers with default SSID use WPA-PSK, and Table 
4.19 shows a greater use of WEP encryption when SSID has been altered. 
 
Chart 4.12 – Inteno encryption, default SSID vs. custom SSID 
Chart 4.12 shows that Inteno routers in many cases are altered to use the less secure WEP 
encryption instead of WPA-PSK. 
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5   DISCUSSION 
In this chapter I will discuss my findings based on my three research questions in consecutive 
order. I will start by discussing the encryption usage in Norway based on the data from my 
war-walk. I will then discuss the Internet broadband providers and their role in WLAN 
security, partially based on my war-walking data and partially based on the supplementary 
sources. Lastly, I will discuss societal challenges we face by ignoring the issues of WLAN 
security. I will also give my opinions on how we should approach these issues. 
5.1 Encryption Usage in Norway 
The number of insecure WLANs in Norway is alarmingly large. 14.2 % of all the WLANs I 
found did not use encryption at all. I was rather surprised to see that Oslo was the only city 
below the average, when considering all the hotels and hotspots a large city has. Out of the 
total 35 194 WLANs in all the cities, 7 606 used WEP. Combined with the unencrypted, it 
means that 36 % of the networks I detected can be broken into within few minutes. The 2.4 % 
SpeedTouch routers with WEP encryption can be broken into by only knowing the SSID. 
Additionally, there are wireless networks that use dictionary-based WPA-PSK. To be able to 
remember their passphrase, many people tend to use a simple and common word. And even if 
the WPA-PSK specification requires a minimum of 8 characters, words such as baseball and 
superman are subject to dictionary attacks and will be found within minutes. It is also popular 
to use phone numbers for passwords, but since Norwegian phone numbers are only 8 digits 
long, an attacker is able to run through every possible phone number in just 15 minutes.  
In research question 1b I ask whether population size or location affect encryption practices. 
My results presented in Chart 4.1 and Chart 4.3, indicate that WLAN security is higher in 
larger cities. Is this because end-users in smaller cities are less aware of potential dangers or 
are simply too trusting of their neighbours? Or is there really less chance of WLAN break-ins 
in smaller cities? 
In areas with lower density of private residences there is likely a lesser chance of perpetrators. 
A perpetrator would in most cases be interested in high density areas where attacks can be 
performed on several sources simultaneously, and where it is possible to stay hidden in a 
rented apartment or hotel room. An unknown car in front of a solitary house would look rather 
suspicious. However, in the areas where I collected the WLAN data, even in the small town 
Flekkefjord, there was always a neighbouring house that could hide a potential perpetrator. 
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Another theory is that end-users in larger cities are more Internet dependent and consequently 
more technology competent. Chart 5.1 below shows the percentage of private broadband 
subscriptions in the sampled cities. 
 
Chart 5.1 – Private broadband subscriptions in percentage (SSB 2011c) 
These numbers could also mean that end-users in larger cities were early adopters of wireless 
networking. As a consequence, the early adopters have had more time to acquire knowledge 
about the technology and the corresponding security issues. At the same time, early adopters 
are more likely to have used WEP encryption if they received their wireless access point from 
an ISP.  
Another reason for area-based variations might be the WLAN owners’ different 
socioeconomic status. I therefore contacted municipalities and Statistics Norway in an attempt 
to find statistics for living conditions. Unfortunately, their data was not categorized in small 
enough geographical sections for me to compare with my sampling areas. 
5.1.1 Comparison to Similar Research 
Hole, Dyrnes and Thorsheim (2005) said that 244 of the 706 wireless access points they found 
were using WEP encryption. That gives 34.6 % using WEP and 65.4 % having no encryption 
at all. When considering that Hole, Dyrnes and Thorsheim did not specify exactly where in 
Bergen they conducted their research, and that WPA is now significantly more common, a 
direct comparison is not very relevant. However, some interesting developments can be seen. 
As the percentage of unencrypted wireless networks in my results is 14.8 %, it is apparent that 
using some sort of encryption is much more common today than in 2004. The use of WEP 
also appears to have dropped from 34.6 % to 19.1 %. Furthermore, assuming that they 
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covered an area similar to the area I covered, the number of WLANs in the centre of Bergen 
has increased from about 500 to almost 7 000 in seven years.  
Since little similar research has been done in Norway I had to look abroad. While I hoped and 
expected to find war-driving performed by institutions in Scandinavia or at least in a 
European country, the only credible source I could find was from Hong Kong. This research 
from December 2010 showed 14 % unencrypted networks and 34 % WEP encryption (PISA 
and WTIA 2011). Compared to my results there were 12.9 % unencrypted networks in Oslo 
and 21.2 % with WEP encryption. However, due to the structural and cultural differences I 
find it unproductive to speculate on the reasons for the differences. Nevertheless, the study 
from Hong Kong showed an improvement in encryption practices over the last years. 
Unfortunately, except for the study by Hole, Dyrnes and Thorsheim, there are no available 
data I can compare my results with in Norway.  
5.1.2 Common SSIDs and Manufacturers 
In Table 4.8 I presented the 8 most common network names. All the occurrences of these 
default SSIDs turned out to be 11 % of the total 35 194 WLANs. But this percentage is based 
on the network names set by the manufacturer and does not include access points set up by 
larger businesses, hotels and institutions. It also does not include the wireless routers provided 
by ISPs that only differs in SSID by the last characters. Subtracting all these network names 
that are not set manually by end-users, I found out that about 50 - 60 % use a custom SSID.  
Obviously, the use of default network name does not have to mean that encryption has not 
been set. I compared the various encryptions on WLANs with custom SSID to WLANs with 
default SSID, and the difference was significant. There was more than twice the chance for a 
network to be unencrypted if it had default SSID from manufacturer. PSK was less used but 
surprisingly also WEP. Additionally, none of the WLANs used 802.1X.  
It appears that wireless access points bought retail are commonly used without enabling 
encryption. Wireless networks with SSIDs such as dlink and linksys, for instance, were 
unencrypted for 50 % of the occurrences. However, the unencrypted percentage for 
AirLink59300 and AirLink89300 was less than 5 %. The reason for this is that access points 
from D-Link and Linksys are distributed with encryption disabled and do not require any user 
configuration to work, except for plugging them into a power socket. The Air:Link access 
points from Jensen Scandinavia (SSID AirLink59300 and AirLink89300) are conversely sold 
preconfigured with WPA-PSK enabled and also support WPS (Wi-Fi Protected Setup). These 
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percentages show that many tend to disregard encryption when setting up wireless networks. 
Additionally, it shows how important it is that the manufacturers distribute the access points 
preconfigured with encryption. 
In Table 4.10 I presented the 8 most common manufacturers of wireless networks that I found 
in my war-walk. This showed that D-Link has 19 % of the access point market and Cisco and 
Cisco-Linksys combined have 22 %. In general, access points by Cisco are intended for the 
business market whereas the access points by Cisco-Linksys are intended for the private 
market. The majority of D-Link access points are sold retail, but 16 % had a recognizable 
SSID that meant they were distributed by the broadband provider GET. As mentioned before, 
the access points from ZyXEL are distributed by Telenor and the ones from Inteno are 
distributed by NextGenTel. The access points from Edimax are sold under the brand name 
Air:Link by Jensen Scandinavia. 
5.1.3 The IEEE 802.1X Standard 
Even though I do not elaborate much on the use of 802.1X in this thesis, I will now present 
some of the parties that utilize WLANs with the mentioned authentication mechanism. The 
information is deduced from the SSIDs and locations of the relevant access points. 
In Oslo, there were many university WLANs and quite a few owned by Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs
28
 and the National Rail Administration
29
 that were using 802.1X authentication. A few 
other examples of wireless network using 802.1X were the newspaper VG, Norwegian State 
Railways
30
 and Oslo Courthouse. I also noticed that out of the 923 WLANs in Oslo that used 
802.1X authentication, 22 % where using hidden SSID. This is in strong contrast to the other 
Norwegian cities where it was only 0 – 6 %.  
Almost all wireless networks with 802.1X authentication in Bergen were connected to one of 
the faculties of University of Bergen, but a few were connected to other educational facilities. 
As in Oslo, the Norwegian National Rail Administration and some other businesses were also 
utilizing 802.1X.  
In Tromsø, location and SSIDs such as TFK-Elev, HN-IKT, UNN and eduroam indicated that 
most of the 802.1X networks belonged to the university or another educational institution. 
                                                 
28
 Utenriksdepartementet. 
29
 Jernbaneverket. 
30
 Norges Statsbaner (NSB). 
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UNN stands for University Hospital of North Norway
31
, HN-IKT belongs to Northern 
Norway Regional Health Authority
32
  and eduroam stands for Education Roaming.  
In Kristiansand there were many 802.1X WLANs belonging to an upper secondary school. 
Additionally, several others were spread around the city centre that did not have an SSID with 
a recognizable name.  
In Flekkefjord, all 24 wireless networks using 802.1X authentication were made by the same 
manufacturer, ProcurveNet. The SSIDs used were SOadmin, Sadmin, Tadmin and USAdmin. 
Almost all of the networks were found in close vicinity of a school or a kindergarten.  
The primary protection against WPA-PSK cracking “is to use enterprise class security instead 
of the PSK”, and the name WPA-Enterprise for 802.1X usage seems well justified (Carpenter 
and Barrett 2008, 454). A combination of location data and SSID often makes it easy to 
identify the owner of a WLAN, and it showed that the majority of wireless networks using 
802.1X appeared to be owned by an educational institution. In the cases where it did not, 
802.1X was rarely in use in private residencies. A likely reason for this is a more troublesome 
configuration process compared to using WEP and PSK. While the other cities had few to 
none cloaked WLANs using 802.1X, Oslo had as many as 22 %. Even though I cannot be 
sure, I assume most of them are owned by a few big companies that require broad network 
coverage. The few hidden SSIDs I was able to see with Kismet also supported this 
assumption.   
5.1.4 Temporal Key Integrity Protocol (TKIP) 
In Section 4.2.4 I showed that TKIP was used in 83 % of access points employing 
WPA/WPA2 encryption. For the TKIP attack to succeed, however, certain conditions must be 
met. Firstly, the access point must support QoS (Quality of Service). Secondly, key renewal 
interval needs to be longer than the attack period of around 20 minutes (Halvorsen et al. 
2009). However, it is common practice by access point manufacturers to set this interval to 60 
minutes. 
The practical attacks on TKIP are so far limited to Denial of Service, DNS spoofing and direct 
traffic between network clients and an attacker without network authorization. The latter can 
for instance be used to “exploit some un-patched vulnerability at the client” (Halvorsen et al. 
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 Universitetssykehuset Nord-Norge. 
32
 Helse Nord RHF. 
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2009, 129). However, the current TKIP attack is not a key recovery attack and can therefore 
not be used to crack the passphrase of the WLAN. Halvorsen et al. expressed it neatly by 
saying “TKIP was developed to fix the insecurity of WEP, but now it is TKIP that needs to be 
fixed” (2009, 132). However, instead of altering the encryption protocol, they believe the best 
approach is to migrate to CCMP.  
5.2 The Role of the Internet Service Providers 
Several Internet service providers offer a wireless router when their customers order 
broadband. As previously mentioned, NextGenTel estimated to have delivered such routers to 
about 70 % of their broadband customers. While some of these wireless routers may not be in 
use, there are also additional access points bought retail. If assuming that 70 % of all 
broadband subscriptions have WLANs employed, there are 1.2 million access points in 
Norway. This number is based on the 1.7 million broadband subscriptions reported by the 
Post and Telecommunications Authority (PT 2011). Unfortunately, due to the nature of 
wireless technology, there is no way to measure the current circulation of wireless networks. 
Google, with its location-based services, is probably the party that has the largest database of 
wireless access points. I tried contacting them for statistical data regarding both distribution of 
WLANs and encryption use, but their press contacts were unable to help me. 
Wireless routers distributed by ISPs are often preconfigured with SSID and WEP/WPA-PSK 
encryption so the client can get online without a difficult setup process. Depending on the 
method used to create the information, this preconfigured state poses a threat to security. This 
chapter will show how configuring the router information by using an algorithm can be 
problematic.  
In Section 4.3.1 I showed that few tend to change the pre-set SSID from their ISP. I think the 
reason for the higher ratio of custom SSIDs on SpeedTouch routers is due to their early 
entrance to the broadband market. For one thing, that means that the owners of such routers 
have had more time to change configurations. More importantly, the SpeedTouch routers have 
been delivered with weaker encryption enabled than for instance ZyXEL and Inteno are now. 
When many of these SpeedTouch routers were installed, there was less awareness of WLAN 
encryption and WEP vulnerability.  
The MAC addresses of the ZyXEL routers I found in my research show that there are certain 
MAC ranges that almost exclusively use WEP encryption, and other MAC ranges that only 
use WPA-PSK. These different MAC ranges indicate that various router models are delivered 
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with different encryption. Table 4.16 showed that there were just a few unencrypted ZyXEL 
routers with default SSID. That means that if end-users alter the encryption on the routers but 
keep the SSID, they either change from WEP to WPA-PSK or vice versa. And because the 
MAC ranges give away the original encryption, I can find out what is most common. 
Surprisingly, even though only 1 % of the ZyXEL routers with default SSID had gotten the 
encryption altered, in most cases the change was from WPA to WEP and not the other way 
around. I believe the reason for this is the use of obsolete hardware and certain devices such 
as the handheld game console Nintendo DS, which do not support WPA. 
Table 4.17 showed an increased use of unencrypted ZyXEL routers with custom SSID 
compared to default SSID. Initially I believed this was due to small stores and cafés providing 
free internet for their customers. But while the relevant SSIDs showed several recognizable 
names of cafés, the majority used the SSID homerun, which are hotspots set up by Telenor.  
There could also be a connection between choice of ISP and post-distributed configuration of 
the router. My results in Table 4.18 and Table 4.19 showed that users with Inteno routers 
often changed SSID but kept the WPA-PSK encryption. While I can only speculate, perhaps 
customers who choose NextGenTel over Telenor are more computer literate or security-
conscious. Another reason could be that the installation process and configuration setup on 
Inteno routers are more user-friendly, and therefore easier to alter. There is also a third 
possibility in that Inteno routers are altered because they have a less secure passphrase than 
the ZyXEL routers, but I believe such cases to be rare.  
5.2.1 Vulnerable ZyXEL Routers 
July 19, 2010, a user under the pseudonym Ranvik (2010b) started a thread on the Norwegian 
Internet forum Norsk Freakforum
33
. He claimed that he had found out a way to calculate the 
default WPA password on ZyXEL P2602HWT routers used by Telenor, and asked forum 
members to post the MAC address of routers they wanted password to. This was, however, 
not done in the same way as Kevin Devine did in 2008, but rather by opening his router and 
using a JTAG and a TTL cable to isolate a program that ran when the router was booting up. 
Ranvik explained that the TTL cable gave him console access to the router and the JTAG 
cable gave access to everything stored on it (Groten 2010, #102). The program he isolated 
was creating the MAC address and WPA password on the router from its serial number, and 
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 The web page for Norsk Freakforum can be found at: http://www.freak.no/  
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Ranvik was able to retrieve the passwords he wanted by modifying this (Ranvik 2010b, #514) 
(Bie 2010). 
The forum thread accelerated quickly and after a month he had posted nearly 100 WPA 
passwords to Telenor’s routers. He then created a script that automated the process and 
answered to 500 more requests from the forum users until the 25
th
 of October (Ranvik 2010b, 
#193). That is when another forum user called Groten (2010) published a list of 9 000 
WLANs located in Norway. The list included access points’ GPS coordinates, SSID, MAC 
addresses and the WPA passwords. All these access points were made by ZyXEL and sent out 
by Telenor to broadband customers. This meant that anyone could now log into any of these 
9 000 networks and exploit them in numerous ways. The security breach quickly hit the news 
and gave Telenor a large amount of bad publicity. Communications Manager in Telenor, Per 
A. Meling, claimed they had known about the problem for four months but not taken counter-
measures due to its “very small scope” (Nilsen 2010; Gilbrant 2010a). He also claimed that 
nobody had been hacked due to this problem, but later retracted it by saying that Telenor 
cannot know if anyone has been hacked or how many if so. A couple of days later Meling said 
they were now in the process of calling every owner of the access points on the published list 
and that they were going to report Groten to the police (Gilbrant 2010b).  
A few days after Meling’s statement, someone created a profile on Norsk Freakforum named 
Maclist and published a list of 165 000 Telenor routers made by ZyXEL. However, this list 
did not include SSID and passwords, but MAC addresses, GPS locations and the geographical 
addresses instead. An anonymous source revealed to me that the data was originally gathered 
by Google and were subsequently retrieved by sending multiple queries to Google’s servers. 
While the thread was removed by forum moderators after just three hours, it was picked up in 
Google’s cache and remained available for months. The thread is completely removed now, 
but I saved a copy for my research that shows that the link to the list of 165 000 WLANs is 
still functional. Since Ranvik only needed the MAC address to find both the SSID and WPA 
password, he could easily have run these MAC addresses through his automated script and 
thereby have known the location and WPA password for 165 000 WLANs provided by 
Telenor. At the time of this writing (May 2011), Ranvik has not been online since a post on 
Freakforum November 22th, which was around the same time his web page was taken down. 
Groten also stopped being online, but wrote a post the 3
rd
 of January wishing Telenor a good 
year with users wanting safer networks (Groten 2010, #213). 
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5.2.2 Potentially Vulnerable Routers 
Telenor is not the only ISP in Norway that uses software to automatically configure routers 
with WPA encryption. NextGenTel, GET and Ventelo are other examples. While Telenor has 
a market share of 48.8 % (Canal Digital included), these three other broadband providers have 
the combined market share of 25.4 % (PT 2011). In 2009 Ranvik actually published a guide 
on how to crack default WPA passwords on Inteno routers from NextGenTel. But due to the 
cracking progress taking over a week and the fact that most Inteno routers appeared to be 
using hexadecimals and not only digits as first assumed, the thread did not get much attention 
(Ranvik 2010a). However, during the period when ZyXEL passwords were published, Ranvik 
claimed he was able to calculate the first two of ten hexadecimals in default WPA passwords 
on Inteno routers (Ranvik 2010b). While there are 1 100 billion possibilities for 10 
hexadecimals, the remaining 8 hexadecimals limit the number of possibilities to 4 billion. 
Assuming Ranvik‘s claim was legit, he would be able to break into NextGenTel WLANs 
within 7 hours on a desktop computer utilizing the AMD Radeon HD 6990 graphics card
34
. 
In the forum thread on the ZyXEL passwords Ranvik also mentioned that he was acquiring a 
router from GET as well to see if they had a similar vulnerability he could exploit (Ranvik 
2010b). However, I was informed
35
 by GET that they used a different practice than Telenor, 
but they did not elaborate on the details.   
BKK is another ISP that used to deliver wireless routers pre-set with WEP encryption. But 
this ISP also prevented access to the router’s configuration settings, which meant that the 
BKK customers were unable to change the encryption. The result was that every WLAN 
provided by BKK (SSID was BKKYYYY) could easily be cracked within minutes. Fortunately, 
when Ventelo bought BKK’s broadband client portfolio in 2009, consisting of 11 500 
broadband users, they also replaced the router encryption with WPA (Ventelo 2009). 
Additionally, Product Manager in Ventelo, Svein Asle Bjørheim, explained
36
 that existing 
users were told to return their wireless routers. In theory, this meant that all routers from BKK 
with WEP encryption would seize to exist. The complete absence of BKK SSIDs in my war-
walk in Bergen goes far in confirming this.   
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 E-mail correspondence with Øyvind Husby, press contact in GET, 04.04.2011. 
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5.2.3 Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) 
Security Officer in Telenor, Rune Dyrlie, said
37
 that Telenor started employing WPA 
encryption from September 2009 with the shipping of ZyXEL P2602HWT routers. He also 
said that they still distribute wireless routers from Thomson SpeedTouch preconfigured with 
WEP. This is done despite the fact that WEP was already in 2004 declared deprecated by 
IEEE with the ratification of the 802.11i standard (IEEE 2004). Telenor’s late employment of 
WPA, however, can be excused due to compatibility issues with older hardware. Also various 
other ISPs have distributed Thomson SpeedTouch routers with WEP encryption, and through 
my research it became evident that there are still a large number of these routers with pre-set 
WEP encryption.  
The Thomson SpeedTouch routers distributed through broadband providers in Norway that 
are vulnerable to Devine’s exploit, use either the SSID privatZZZZZZ, SpeedTouchZZZZZZ or 
ThomsonZZZZZZ. Based on Telenor’s list of wireless routers on their web page, networks 
with the SSID privatZ* and SpeedTouchZ* have been delivered by Telenor. But as 
NextGenTel and Telenor both have distributed SpeedTouch 585 routers with SSID 
SpeedTouchZ*, it is impossible to know which broadband provider these WLANs are 
connected to. I tried to look at Thomson user manuals and user guides on the ISP web pages 
to match examples of MAC addresses to my data material, but I could still not differentiate 
SpeedTouchZ* between Telenor and NextGenTel. The last preconfigured SpeedTouch SSID I 
found was ThomsonZ*, but I have been unable to find out which ISP distributes it. It is 
certain, however, that privatZ* is only distributed by Telenor.  
As previously mentioned, WEP has become very easy to crack by exploiting the RC4 stream 
cipher as discovered by Fluhrer, Mantin and Shamir (FMS) (2001). But this FMS attack 
requires packet monitoring in close range to the access point. However, if details from the 
ISPs’ setup process of routers are discovered, WLANs can be broken into as shown in Section 
2.2.1 and Section 5.2.1. Contrary to the FMS attack, cracking the passphrases for these access 
points will only require the MAC address or SSID, and can be performed without packet 
monitoring. The simplicity of breaking into these WLANs means that just about anyone can 
gain unauthorised access. 
Furthermore, since Telenor and other ISPs over the years have shipped several routers with 
WEP encryption, a large number of WLANs have been exposed. My results in Table 4.12, 
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which show that there were 1 046 WEP-encrypted Thomson SpeedTouch routers, indicate 
that ISPs tend to ignore older routers that are not up to date on security. The customers pay 
the same subscription fee, but the early adopters of ISP’s WLAN routers get less security if 
they do not know how to change it.   
Chart 4.8 shows that SpeedTouch routers delivered by Telenor (SSID privatZ*) have a higher 
market share in smaller cities. These numbers are of course highly affected by how common 
Telenor is as an Internet provider in the different areas. While I was unable to find 
information showing differences between ISPs in regional broadband subscriptions, Telenor 
had 870 000 broadband customers nationwide at the end of the first quarter of 2011 (Telenor 
2011). This number includes customers from their wholly-owned subsidiary, Canal Digital, 
which currently provides broadband access for 266 000
38
 customers through cable television. 
From the total 35 194 WLANs I detected, there were 852 WEP-encrypted with the SSID 
privatZ*. This gives the percentage of 2.4 %. Even though the calculation tool made by Kevin 
Devine reportedly worked on routers that were delivered with WPA as well, my findings 
showed that use of this encryption was a rarity on the SpeedTouch routers distributed by 
Telenor. Out of 873 WLANs named privatZ*, only 21 used WPA and the rest used WEP. 
Someone with illicit intent is most likely indifferent whether or not the wireless router is an 
unaltered Thomson SpeedTouch with a pre-set encryption, as long as the network is using 
WEP. This is because this adversary knows how to break in either way. But for the average 
person looking for free access to Internet, Devine’s easy method of retrieving the password to 
SpeedTouch routers becomes an option. 
5.2.4 Wi-Fi Protected Access Pre-shared Key (WPA-PSK) 
WLANs that are unencrypted, use WEP or a dictionary passphrase with WPA-PSK, offer 
limited security. A fourth aspect, that in practice could reduce security, is preconfigured 
routers. Due to the nature of my research I am unable to establish with 100 % certainty 
whether the router configuration has been modified after the ISP sent it out. But if a wireless 
network uses an SSID identical to the ones from an ISP and has the same type of encryption 
and MAC range (has the same manufacturer), I believe it is fair to presume that this WLAN is 
still using preconfigured settings. If an end-user was to change encryption on his access point, 
I think he in most cases would change the SSID as well. The opposite scenario where end-
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users who change SSID are also likely to change password, is the reason why I primarily 
sorted the results in Table 4.13 from SSID and not MAC range. Even though the method 
Ranvik used on Telenor’s routers only required the MAC address, it would presumably not 
work on networks where the SSID has been changed.  
Despite the fact that the number of preconfigured SpeedTouch routers with WPA was only 
157, they are presumably all possible to crack with Devine’s method. The exception is when 
the router is newer than the summer of 2010, when Internet users claimed that Thomson had 
changed their encryption process. In Table 4.13 I showed that 4 787 (13.6 %) of all the 
wireless routers I detected had SSID from an ISP and used WPA-PSK encryption. This 
preconfigured state introduces a potential vulnerability in which the password can be 
calculated if the algorithm is found, or if someone finds a way to create passwords through the 
wireless router as Ranvik did. I have, however, not been able to obtain in-depth details on the 
encryption process from the ISPs, as many were reluctant to reveal such information. Director 
of Marketing and Information in NextGenTel, Morten Ågnes, explained
39
 that divulging 
security practices to the public could attract unwanted attention and be a security risk in itself. 
He did, however, confirm that their routers by default used 10 hexadecimals as passphrase. 
While NextGenTel considers this as sufficient, it is considerably less secure than the 10 
alphabetic characters Telenor uses and the 11 alphabetic and hexadecimals GET uses. Table 
5.1 below shows the passphrase strength of the four largest ISPs in Norway that distribute 
wireless routers. 
ISP Length Characters Possibilities In billions 
NextGenTel 10 0-9 a-f 1610 1 100 
Telenor 10 a-z 2610 141 000 
Ventelo 8 0-9 a-z A-Z 628 218 000 
GET 11 0-9 a-z 3611 131 600 000 
Table 5.1 – WPA passphrase strength of the largest ISPs that distribute wireless routers 
 
These numbers indicate that GET is better prepared for a potential major breakthrough in 
brute-force attack speed. With the encryption scheme above, a brute-force attack on a GET 
router would take 900 and 120 000 times longer than on Telenor and NextGenTel routers 
respectively. The routers from Ventelo, which are manufactured by Jensen Scandinavia AS, 
use shorter passphrases than the routers from NextGenTel and Telenor, but are still more 
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secure due to the variation of characters. Additionally, a computer technician from Jensen 
said
40
 that their routers generate the WPA passphrase in a “completely different way” than 
Telenor, and is subsequently not vulnerable to that type of breach.  
The method Ranvik used on ZyXEL routers shows us, however, that a relatively strong 
password can be insufficient if the configuration process is not secure. As Ranvik was able to 
do this, it is plausible that there are also others. A perpetrator, who knows about such 
vulnerabilities and exploits them for illicit purposes, is often better served by keeping them to 
himself.   
Even though preconfigured routers delivered by ISPs have proved to be vulnerable, the logic 
behind the practice is understandable. A preconfigured router using strong encryption and a 
solid password often provides better security than the end-user who often use short and simple 
passwords found in dictionaries. But as the WPA-PSK cracking speed is reaching 200 000 
keys per second on a single graphics card, and GPU clusters are increasing this tenfold, the 
ISPs need to assess their practices and be able to update security on existing routers. Given a 
cluster with 100 computers where every node is able to process 200 000 passphrases per 
second, it would take up to 15 hours to crack WLANs from NextGenTel (10 hexadecimals), 
82 days for Telenor (10 alphabetic) and 126 days for Ventelo (8 mixed). While access to such 
computer power is limited and expensive today, it is hard to predict the situation a few years 
from now. As many of the broadband providers are able to modify their customers’ router 
setups remotely, the challenge is to find a way to upgrade security that does not cause 
problems for the customers.  
In my opinion, the most secure password administration for ISPs is using completely 
randomized passphrases. In that way, the only option of retrieving the passphrases is by brute-
force attack or breaking into the computer system of the vendor or ISP. If the vendor and ISP 
do not keep logs of the generated passphrases, the method of attack is limited to brute-force 
only. 
However, using preconfigured routers might mislead end-users into thinking their WLAN is 
secure forever, and they remain unaware of the dangers linked to wireless networks. Having 
ISPs deliver pre-setup routers is not necessarily a bad idea, but it still requires awareness of 
ICT security. There also has to be a plan of counter-measure ready when flaws are found in 
the security protocols.  
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5.3  Societal Challenges and Countermeasures 
Most people do not realize how insecure wireless networks are. Due to the increasing 
distribution of access points, the associated risks need to be taken seriously. In my opinion, 
insecure WLANs are not only limited to cause problems for end-users, but can also affect our 
society on a national level. An important contributing factor in order to improve security is to 
share the responsibility between the appropriate parties.  
Senior vice president in the GPU manufacturing company Nvidia, Tony Tamasi, presented his 
view on the future of graphics card power at the 2011 East Coast Game Conference (ECGC) 
(Parrish 2011). He claimed that GPU performance would increase 1 000 % by 2015, based on 
annual growth rate between 2007 and 2011. Such an increase is also consistent with Moore’s 
law, commonly implying a performance doubling every 18 months, even though opinions 
differ on whether this theory applies to GPUs. The GPU company AMD, which currently 
outperforms Nvidia on WPA cracking performance, has shown that their GPU power between 
2005 and 2009 actually outpaced Moore’s law (Chu 2010).  
The prediction of 10 times faster brute-forcing of PSK in 2015 is a potential problem to 
passphrase strength that currently is sufficient. For one thing, the problem applies to WLANs 
that are still using the same password 5 years from now, which by then could be possible to 
crack. That scenario is only problematic if the WLAN encryption is not being updated 
according to advances in cracking technology. A more serious problem arises when 
information is still sensitive after many years. Even without the key, a determined perpetrator 
can capture the encrypted data being transferred wirelessly, and then store everything on his 
hard drives. When the cracking performance reaches a level high enough and the perpetrator 
is able to crack the passphrase, he can decrypt the information he captured from years back.  
From an adversary’s point of view, I believe there are two different factors of interest when 
selecting wireless networks to break into. The first one is that a high density of insecure 
WLANs increases the odds of finding a suitable target to monitor. A high density also most 
likely means a more crowded area and therefore less exposure of the adversary. The second 
factor is that a high percentage of insecure WLANs also means a larger chance that a pre-
chosen target is insecure. Instead of breaking into random networks, an attacker in Norway 
can use the publicly available lists of people’s income to find potential targets that can 
provide economic winnings. Telephone directories can then be used to find the addresses and 
subsequently lead to attacks on the selected victims. 
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An article published in 2009 challenges another perspective where insecure WLANs are 
causing societal threats. In this report, Hu, Myers, Colizza and Vespignani (2009) 
problematized the risk of  malware on WLANs, and created an epidemiological model to 
estimate its propagation. The authors state that wireless routers are valuable targets because 
they “are the perfect platform to launch a number of attacks that previous security 
technologies have reasonably assumed were unlikely” (Hu et al. 2009, 1318). Hu et al. 
explain this by the fact that wireless routers tend to always be on and connected to the 
Internet, and that there currently is no software specifically aiming to detect or prevent their 
infection. It is required, however, that the routers are in close proximity to each other, much 
like in any urban area. The article points out that such malware would take advantage of 
unencrypted and WEP-encrypted networks, but also of the common usage of default 
passwords for router administration. In a simulated model of Manhattan, New York, the 
authors expect 18 000 wireless routers to be infected within 2 weeks (Hu et al. 2009). They 
also point out that a worm made for wireless networks would not even need to infect any 
personal computers, but could instead be made to monitor data traffic on the router and relay 
it back to the creators of the worm. The creators would then be able to search the traffic for 
valuable data such as credit card information.  
In a short documentary presented by VG in December 2011, member of the Norwegian 
Parliament, Lise Christoffersen, says that they have been instructed by the Parliament to use 
wireless networks when travelling, in order to save money (Gulliksen 2011). Christoffersen 
says that she has asked specifically whether they should use unencrypted networks, to which 
the reply was yes. An anonymous source in the documentary provides the following imagined 
scenario of how such practices can be problematic, even on a national level: A Member of 
Parliament travels to China to negotiate about fishery policy. He sits in a meeting all day and 
goes back to his hotel to write a report. He then uses the hotel’s wireless network and sends 
the report back to Norway via e-mail. But at the same time, and without his knowledge, the 
report is being printed out and brought to the Chinese who will face him the next day around 
the negotiating table.  
The example above is just one of many scenarios that could happen if key personnel are 
incautious with sensitive information. It can also be transferred to other sections where 
employees take their work home and handle it on insecure WLANs. In extreme situations I 
believe it can affect critical functions in society such as power, transport and economy – 
perhaps in collaboration with social engineering methods explained in the paragraph below.  
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Social engineering is a popular method by scammers to retrieve sensitive information from 
unsuspecting victims, and I believe insecure WLANs are contributing to this. Carpenter and 
Barrett  explain social engineering as “a technique used for persuading people to give you 
something that they should not give you” (2008, 460). If a person gets a phone call from a 
scammer pretending to be working in a bank, the person will most likely refuse to give up 
sensitive data such as credit card details. But if the scammer had personal information about 
the victim and his recent online purchases, the case might be different. Such information 
could have been retrieved by the scammer through a WLAN break-in, where e-mail login 
details were monitored. Scammers who are skilled at social engineering can make persons 
divulge almost anything (Joshi, Das, and Saha 2009). For such reasons it is not sufficient to 
have a secure computer system if the user practices are insecure.  
5.3.1 WLAN Breaches in Norway 
There have been few incidents of big scale WLAN breaches in Norway. If there has been any, 
it has rarely gotten media coverage. The reason for this could be that there simply are no 
breaches in Norway caused by attacks on wireless networks. Does that mean that insecure 
WLANs in practice pose no threat and that there is no need to secure your network? A more 
probable reason is that such attacks are rarely being noticed. Breaking into a WLAN and then 
monitoring it for sensitive information, leaves very little footprint. Say the attacker logs onto 
the victim’s e-mail account. If this is done on the victim’s wireless network, all logs will show 
that the e-mail is being accessed from the normal address. The only footprint an attacker 
leaves on the router is the MAC address – an address that can be spoofed with the click of a 
button.  
The previously mentioned report by The National Institute for Consumer Research on identity 
theft says that about 240 000 persons in Norway have experienced some sort of identity theft 
(Brusdal and Lavik 2011). These acts were executed by exploiting the identity to either take 
up loans or credit, purchase products or services, or to damage reputation through name 
abuse. The report states that 10 % of the survey participants say that their identity theft have 
not been resolved (Brusdal and Lavik 2011). At the same time, Head of Communications at 
Telenor, Kristin V. Tønnessen, claims that about 50 % of the identity thefts Telenor reports 
are being dismissed (Dvergedal and Melby 2012). Assistant Chief of Police at the National 
Police Directorate
41
, Torgeir Magnussen, explains that the percentage of dismissed cases is 
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difficult to estimate because there are no penalty provisions for identity thefts specifically 
(Dvergedal and Melby 2012).  
While the case scenarios in the report do not directly point out wireless networks as a 
gateway, they do mention online purchases as a source of credit card theft as well as misuse 
of national identity number to take up loans. Both of these methods can originate from 
network monitoring, and many have no clue how they have been victimized. A common 
scenario is that a perpetrator uses the national identity number to order several credit cards, 
steal the credit ratings from the post box and then the credit cards themselves when they 
arrive. When these credit cards are abused, the victims are left with a huge hassle of clearing 
payment remarks. Chief Executive Officer in the insurance company HELP Forsikring, Johan 
Dolven, says that this often requires assistance from lawyers due to its magnitude (Furuseth 
2012).   
5.3.2 Common Security Myths  
The official study guide for CWNA (Certified Wireless Network Administrator) lists four 
common recommendations that “either provide no added security or minimal added security” 
(Carpenter and Barrett 2008, 518). These are all indications of erroneous assumptions caused 
by insufficient information.  
 MAC filtering 
 SSID cloaking 
 Current equipment uses “better WEP” 
 Wireless networks cannot be secured 
A common myth is that enabling MAC filtering is sufficient to deny intruders access to a 
network (Carpenter and Barrett 2008). Finding out whether a network has this function 
enabled, however, requires an attempt to connect to the access point. Hence, my research 
cannot be used to show if there is a widespread use of MAC filtering. Nevertheless, I believe 
it is important to point out that such filtering is no substitution for a solid encryption. MAC 
filtering can be easily defeated using MAC address spoofing (Gast 2005; Carpenter and 
Barrett 2008). 
SSID cloaking is an attempt of providing security through secrecy, an approach commonly 
referred to as security through obscurity. In terms of wireless networks, however, an SSID is 
not a secret (Cache, Wright, and Liu 2010). Passive sniffers, such as Kismet, will show the 
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SSID when a client associates with the network. It is even possible for a perpetrator to 
perform a deauthentication attack to force a client to reconnect instead of waiting for it to 
happen (Cache, Wright, and Liu 2010). Cloaked SSID is consequently only stopping the 
occasional bandwidth stealer and the persons who generally do not pose a threat.  
In Section 4.2.1 I showed that 3.8 % of the WLANs I found had cloaked SSID. As shown in 
Chart 4.6, it was apparent that the percentage of insecure WLANs was higher when the 
networks were cloaked (43 % versus 36 %). While it is difficult to know for certain, I believe 
that end-users assume that hiding the SSID makes the network secure from intruders. It is also 
possible that some manufacturers have deactivated the SSID broadcast by default, and thus 
bringing in a new potential factor of error to my results – in addition to the relatively low 
number of cloaked networks. Consequently, I studied the data from cloaked networks in 
detail, but did not find any protruding irregularities. Because the network name is hidden on 
cloaked networks, it is more difficult to point out variations that could help with identification 
and comparisons. As such, there is no denying that the network name on visible networks 
often reveals a large amount of information. The remaining factors with value when the SSID 
is hidden are the MAC address, manufacturer, location and encryption.  
When the initial scare of WEP’s vulnerability hit, many vendors started implementing altered 
versions of the encryption protocol. Carpenter and Barrett (2008) say that, as a result, people 
started to think that new hardware fixed the WEP problems. The authors further argue that 
vendors should not be trusted to have implemented algorithms that protect against WEP 
weaknesses just because they use newer hardware (Carpenter and Barrett 2008).  
There is also a notion that WLANs simply cannot be properly secured. In the official study 
guide for CWNA, Carpenter and Barrett state that wireless networks can be employed in a 
secure fashion by “using IEEE 802.11i (Clause 9 of IEEE 802.11-2007) and strong EAP 
types” (2008, 520). They further point out that WLANs can be far more secure than most 
wired LANs that do not use any real authentication mechanisms at the node level. 
Additionally and in a business perspective, to refrain from employing a WLAN increases the 
odds of employees installing rogue access points in the workplace (Carpenter and Barrett 
2008). 
When it comes to security myths, my impression is that if a wireless network is unencrypted, 
its users believe they have nothing to hide or do not consider the risks they expose themselves 
to. If the network is WEP-encrypted or cloaked, the users most likely think that their 
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connection is secure. These WLAN security myths are an obstacle in the process of securing 
wireless networking.  
5.3.3 Security Measures by State Institutions 
Following the Mumbai terror attacks in 2008 where related terror e-mails had been sent 
anonymously over WLAN connections, the Mumbai police created a task force to get rid of 
all insecure WLANs (Gadgil and D'Monte 2009). In the city believed to have over 30 000 
unencrypted or anonymous WLANs, around 80 police personnel and 100 volunteers were 
trained for this task. The approach taken was to drive through Mumbai and directing owners 
of unencrypted networks to secure it. The Mumbai police told Business Standard that “If the 
Wi-Fi connection in a particular place is not password protected or secured then the 
policemen accompanying the squad will have the authority to issue a notice to the owner of 
the connection directing him to secure it “ (Gadgil and D'Monte 2009). 
Also Queensland Police in Australia planned in 2009 to conduct war-driving around selected 
towns in Queensland (Winterford 2009). In this case the police would pay a friendly visit to 
the households or small businesses that had open networks, and inform them of the risks they 
were exposed to. Queensland Police also stated they were going to promote it through media 
in order to highlight the significance of the problem. They were also hoping to return to the 
surveyed areas within a month to see if there had been any improvement. But even though I 
contacted Queensland Police and Mumbai Police on several occasions, they were unable to 
provide me with information on the current state of WLAN security in the respective areas. 
On a similar note, the top criminal court in Germany ruled in May 2010 that private users 
were obligated to adequately secure their WLANs in order to prevent “third parties abusing it 
to commit copyright violation” (Grieshaber 2010). While owners of insecure networks now 
risk fines up to 100 euros, the court ruled that they would not be held responsible for the 
unauthorized criminal activity itself. The court did not expect users to constantly be updating 
security, but rather required setting up a password during WLAN installation.  
5.3.4 Countermeasures and Recommendations 
From an end-user perspective, the general approach to protect WLANs is to employ a strong 
encryption protocol in combination with a strong password. This means using WPA2-PSK, 
CCMP and preferably a long, complex and random passphrase. If TKIP is required, key 
renewal interval should be set to a low value. The Wi-Fi Alliance recommends that the 
passphrase should be at least 8 characters long and a mixture of symbols and upper and lower 
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case letters (Wi-Fi Alliance 2012). They give FJ45od$# and %GkdR#$43 as examples of 
effective passphrases and JohnDoe123 and 543Main as ineffective. The first two examples 
would take up to 1 900 years and 182 000 years respectively to brute-force at 100 000 PSKs 
per second. While the latter two examples would take 266 000 years and 400 days to brute-
force, dictionary attacks make them far less secure than the first two examples. The Wi-Fi 
Alliance (2012) states that passphrases should not contain personal information or words 
found in dictionaries. Additionally, the off-the-shelf SSID should be changed into something 
uncommon to avoid rainbow table attacks. Periodically changing the passphrase is also 
recommended. From a business perspective it is often better to employ the enterprise version 
(802.1X) of WPA2 than PSK. While it requires a more difficult installation process, the added 
security it offers should weigh up.  
It is also important to prepare for and predict encryption vulnerabilities and breakthroughs in 
decryption methods. As clever use of graphical processing units significantly accelerated 
brute-forcing, quantum computing has the potential to ridicule many of today’s encryption 
protocols. I am not saying that all encryption algorithms must be able to withstand a future 
threat of quantum computing, but there must be a plan ready for when security mechanisms 
become obsolete.  
In May 2010, the Wi-Fi Alliance presented a roadmap that showed their plans for the 
certification with regard to encryption protocols (Fleishman 2010). This roadmap said that 
TKIP were to be prohibited from 2011 on access points and from 2012 on all devices, except 
as a component in mixed mode. In 2013, WEP will be disallowed for access points and in 
2014 for all devices. This late deprecation of WEP is due to certain legacy devices that cannot 
be upgraded (Fleishman 2010). Also mixed mode of TKIP/AES will be prohibited from 2014. 
The slow-going process of certification amendment is a problem when considering how 
quickly encryption algorithms may be exploited when vulnerabilities are found. The Wi-Fi 
certification is also not solving the problem of old routers employing deprecated encryption. 
As such, even though the Wi-Fi Alliance’s constantly evolving certification is a step in the 
right direction, it is not sufficient in providing general WLAN security.  
There are, however, signs of improvement. For instance, the new user interface for ZyXEL 
routers show an indication of password strength when the user is configuring the WLAN 
security settings. There is little point for the Wi-Fi Alliance to enforce strong encryption 
protocols if ISPs and end-users are using too simple passwords. Furthermore, as access point 
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manufacturers use different user interfaces for their router configurations, the simplicity of 
enabling encryption can be an important factor in improving WLAN security. 
The previously mentioned security measures by state institutions show initiative from 
authorities in different parts of the world. Whether these approaches have had beneficial 
effect is difficult to say without further research. While there is no doubt that the technology 
to secure wireless networks exists and can be easily applied, the challenge is to enlighten and 
convince everyone to use it. An important part of this challenge is to find out what sectors are 
to be appointed this responsibility, whether it is the router manufacturers, ISPs, state 
institutions or other establishments.  
In my opinion, router manufacturers, ISPs and state institutions have a shared responsibility in 
securing wireless networks. Even though router manufacturers do not necessarily benefit from 
distributing routers with a preconfigured passphrase, a reputation of strong security is 
generally desirable. As several manufacturers make wireless routers for the ISPs, it is 
important that the manufacturers do not follow ill-advised specifications suggested by the 
ISPs, but instead counter with amendment proposals. 
From the Internet service providers’ point of view, secure routers would prevent bad publicity 
if the encryption mechanisms get exploited – which happened in the Telenor ZyXEL case. 
While I do not believe that a statutory requirement to secure private WLANs is the right 
approach, I do think it is crucial that organizations such as ICT Norway, Norwegian Centre 
for Information Security and Norwegian Post and Telecommunications Authority work 
together and put pressure on the sectors distributing wireless access points and routers.  
A report on identity thefts by The National Institute for Consumer Research
42
 from December 
2011 investigated security practices in relation to education and age (Brusdal and Lavik 
2011). The report showed that people with a higher education exposed themselves to the risks 
of identity thefts to a greater degree than people with a lower education. More people with 
lower education said that they would hide their pin code entry at ATMs, tear apart sensitive 
papers and log out of computers after sessions. The report also showed that older people was 
better at this than younger people.  
These results, showing that security aspects are taken more lightly by younger persons and 
those with higher education, came as a surprise to me. While the report was not investigating 
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WLAN security, I believe it proves a need for similar research that focuses on wireless 
networks. Revealing insight of user practices will make it easier to approach the security 
issues from the right angle – both from a manufacturing and educational point of view.   
As the report shows that higher education is not enough, it is essential to educate our society 
specifically about the dangers related to ICT security. Mixed recommendations on the ISP 
web pages on whether to use WEP or WPA makes it difficult to choose the right protocol. 
Secure WLANs will not only benefit the end-user, but it will also make for a more resilient 
society in general. Some enlightenment is spread through media where articles expose the 
risks of using open networks, especially when you are travelling. One example is the 
previously mentioned documentary on NRK that demonstrated how vulnerable wireless 
networks can be. Another example is from  May 2011, when researchers from NorSIS 
demonstrated in the newspaper VG the simplicity of creating a fake access point in hotels and 
cafés (Engan 2011). They set up a strong network card as a router and named the SSID as the 
original WLAN. As the network card they used was ten times more powerful than regular 
routers, end-users would connect to the fake access point rather than the original. Because the 
traffic was now going through the researchers’ PC they could monitor every action and steal 
sensitive information when e-mail accounts were logged on. VG published the article as a 
warning for travelling persons that use random WLANs to check their e-mail. The typical 
advice is to only log onto networks that you know belong to the facility you are in and to 
always use https in front of web addresses. There are, however, methods to beat the SSL/TLS 
protocols when https are being used. Nevertheless, the use of this encrypted communication is 
significantly more secure than transferring information unencrypted over regular http.  
In my opinion, a key factor to improve our encryption practices lies within usability. The end-
user needs a simple way of securing his network that does not require an understanding of the 
encryption protocols. At the same time, having a strong encryption on wireless networks does 
not matter if people connect to fake access points deployed by criminals, or share sensitive 
information on unencrypted public WLANs. That means that not only must there be 
awareness on securing home networks, but also on the risks of using wireless networks in 
general. 
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6   SUMMARY 
A central goal of this study was to investigate the degree of insufficiently encrypted wireless 
networks in Norway. I also wanted to find out the reasons for the current status and how to 
improve it. In doing so, I hope to promote WLAN security awareness to the ICT industry and 
the general public. As I have investigated and developed on my initial concerns, I will in this 
chapter summarize my main findings.  
In my first research question I ask about the current state of WLAN encryption in Norway. I 
have shown that there are a large amount of unencrypted and poorly encrypted WLANs in 
Oslo, Bergen, Kristiansand, Tromsø and Flekkefjord. While there were minor fluctuations 
between the cities, my main finding is that at least 36 % of the 35 194 wireless networks in 
my research were insufficiently encrypted. Including WPA-encrypted networks with weak 
passphrases would raise the percentage further. 
I also ask whether city population or location affect encryption usage. While there was a 
higher percentage of insecure WLANs in the smaller cities, I was unable to answer whether 
this was caused by the geographical area or other factors. This would have been easier to 
establish if the cities’ geographical sub-areas were smaller, or if my research had spanned a 
larger area. Had that been the case, it would have been possible to make a comparison with 
existing research on living standards such as education, income and unemployment.  
My second research question is about how the Internet service providers affect the situation. 
It is obvious that they have an important role due to their distribution of wireless access 
points. Their preconfigured routers must use solid encryption, strong passphrases and be 
prepared for breakthroughs in decryption. I have shown that this is not the case for every ISP 
and that they tend to leave the responsibility for securing routers in the hands of their 
customers.  
My third research question concerns the consequences poor WLAN encryption has for our 
society. I have presented a multitude of methods in which wireless networks can be abused, 
and exemplified it with actual events that have occurred. I believe that the broad circulation of 
insecure WLANs contributes to identity thefts, loss of accessibility and business secrets being 
stolen. Additionally, penetrated insecure WLANs could endanger critical functions in our 
society. 
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In research question 3a I ask whether encryption practices have changed over the last few 
years. Even though research on the subject is lacking, I have argued that encryption usage 
seems to be improving. Better ISP practices and increased knowledge is contributing to this. 
The Wi-Fi certification is adapting and routers are more likely to be distributed with WPA 
now. The Wi-Fi Alliance has also presented a roadmap that disallows WEP completely in 
2014.  
In order to answer research question 3b, I have presented my recommendations to improve 
today’s situation by arguing that the responsibility is shared between end-users, broadband 
providers, access point manufacturers as well as the government. End-users must learn to 
secure their WLANs properly and broadband providers need to use solid encryption and 
strong passphrases. The manufacturers must implement logical user interfaces and write 
comprehensible instructions.  
All the different actors involved need to take wireless network security seriously, and 
governmental organizations must find a way to make this happen. By continuing the 
indifference and allowing the problems concerning WLAN security to exist, both the 
individual and the society remain at risk.   
6.1 Future Research 
For future research it would be very interesting to cover the same areas of wireless networks 
and find out if encryption practices are really changing. It would also be interesting to dig 
deeper into causes for the encryption variations between cities, and to compare more specific 
areas within the cities. For instance, comparing business areas versus residential areas could 
be beneficial if considering various approaches to improve the general WLAN security. When 
it comes to user practices, a qualitative study would probably give a better picture of end-user 
reasoning. 
As raising the awareness of the issues of wireless networking was motivating me to write this 
thesis, I want to publish my findings through the media. I have been in dialog with the 
Norwegian Post and Telecommunications Authority who wanted to create an article of my 
findings. I hope this will lead to further and in-depth research on WLAN security in Norway. 
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